17
1489. tt. 12.

An ANSWER *to a late Pamphlet, Intituled,* Obedience and Submission to the Present Government, *Demonstrated* from Bishop *Overall's Convocation-Book.*

THE Author for Introduction begins with charging the Non-swearers with *Malice* or *Ignorance*, for reproaching those of the Church of *England*, who have taken the Oaths, with deserting their Principles.

Perhaps the Authour thinks it a very *malitious* Thing in them, to be deprived of their Livings and Preferments, (for what other Instances of *Malice* they have been guilty of I cannot devise.) Well, it was *spightfully* done of them to lose their Livelyhoods, and in such a reflecting manner, to reproach those who swore, and kept or advanced theirs: Whereas they might have taken the Oaths, and if they could not with a good Conscience, at least they ought to have done it to save the Reputation of their Brethren. The other Branch of the Charge is *Ignorance*, and if by that the Authour means, That they do not know, but those have deserted their Principles, for my part, I confess the Fact, I am thus ignorant, and I wonder when we shall be better inform'd. They have often been called upon to shew the Consistency of their present Practices, either with the General Principles of the Church of *England*, or with their own Principles heretofore, but they will not vouchsafe to doe it. And for any thing this Authour, or any other hath said, we are still like to be kept in Ignorance,

We confess plainly, we have not Skill to reconcile them, and we want their help, and if they will not afford it us, and reconcile them themselves, whose Fault is it? 'Tis true, they are not sparing of Arguments, taken out of *Parsons* the Jesuite, and from the *Rebels* in the Year 42. and from the Advocates of *Cromwell's* Usurpation. These we meet with in every Pamphlet, but we hope we may be pardon'd, if we do not take these for Principles of the Church of *England*, and a Man may look his Eyes out, before he can find any other; and this Authour is the first that ever pretended to produce any publick Act of the Church of *England* in favour of such Practices, and how fairly he hath done it, we shall see by and by.

In the mean time, if what he alledges from thence were true, (as it is not,) it will by no means justifie *them*; for it is at best but a pretence taken up after the Fact. And as a subsequent Law cannot condemn, so neither can it justifie a Fact previous to it. And I presume there is not one single Person, but what had taken the Oath, either before the publication of the *Convocation Book*, or without any respect to it: So that whatever the Sense or Authority of that

Convocation may be, it ſignifies nothing to juſtifie or excuſe the Proceedings of thoſe who knew nothing of it, nor acted with any manner of reference to it. Let them ſhew any other publick Act of the Church, any Opinion of one of the approv'd Sons of the Church of *England*, the Practice of any one that own'd her Principles, in favour of the Doctrines they now teach, and the Practices they now follow, and then they ſay ſomething: But in vain do they pretend to juſtifie themſelves from a *Convocation-Book*, when they had done the Fact before they ever heard of, or ſaw the Book they pretend to juſtifie themſelves by. This Authour talks of *Demonſtration* from this Book, but it concerns him, and others that call themſelves of the Church of *England*, to demonſtrate it from ſomething elſe, or they can never ſatisfie their Conſciences, that they have acted in Conformity to the Principles of the Church of *England*; for thoſe who had done the Buſineſs long before, can never ſhelter themſelves by any Proofs taken from this Book, if any ſuch there be; and whether there are or no, we come now to examine.

P. 2. The Authour ſays, *That he lays down the Doctrine about Government and Allegiance in four Propoſitions, extracted out of the Convocation-Book, to which almoſt the whole Controverſie may be reduc'd*:

And they are theſe:

1. *That the Power of Kings was originally Patriarchal, Derived from God, and not from the People.*

2. *That Deſcent in Hereditary Kingdoms, is the Ordinary way whereby a Right and Title to the Crown is claimable.*

3. *That no Violence is to be uſed to Kings from their own Subjects, for any Irrigularities they commit.*

4. *That having Sworn Allegiance, to a Prince, we cannot, without the dreadfull Guilt of Perjury transferr our Allegiance, whilſt he continues to have an Authoritative Right and Title to the Crown.*

Now 'tis to be remember'd, that the Authour ſaith, that theſe *four Propoſitions* are extracted out of the Convocation Book. I ſuppoſe he does not mean That they are all there, in ſo many Words, (for that is not ſo;) but that he hath in them delivered the ſenſe of the Convocation about *Government* and *Allegiance*; and whether he hath faithfully done ſo, is the ſubject of the preſent Enquiry. And I ſhall ſhew, and (ſince the Authour is delighted with the word) *demonſtrate*, That he hath omitted many things that are material, and pertinent to the preſent Controverſie about Government and Allegiance. That what he hath drawn up into theſe Propoſitions, he hath in ſome of them (if not in all) curtail'd and diminiſh'd the full ſenſe of the Convocation. That, above all, by adding words and Limitations, and Gloſſes, and Explications, he hath deſtroy'd the Text, and perfectly corrupted and perverted their Senſe: I ſhall ſhew this in examining the particulars.

The firſt Propoſition I ſhall examine laſt, becauſe the Authour builds upon it, and ſays, *It is the Ground-work of the whole Diſcourſe*, and gives occaſion for Enquiry into it afterwards. P. 6.

The ſecond Propoſition is thus in the Authour: *That Deſcent in Hereditary Kingdoms is the ordinary way whereby a Right and Title to the Crown is Claimable.* And that we may be ſure not to miſtake him, he adds, *I ſay, is the Ordinary way*: But I ſay, that *Ordinary way* is his own, and not in the Text, nor can be made out *in the ſenſe of the Authour*: For though there may be ſome extraordinary ways in hereditary Kingdoms, that may give a Right and Title to the Crown, beſides Deſcent, as God's P. 4.

God's particular Nomination and Appointment, the Extinction or Submiſſion of the Right Heirs. Yet the Authour's *extraordinary way* is none of them: For though in explaining this Propoſition he tells us, (according to the Convocation,) that the Lord may and is able to overthrow Kings, notwithſtanding any Claim, Right, Title, or Intereſt, that they can chalenge to to their Kingdoms; yet if he be conſiſtent to himſelf, by all this he means only God's *permiſſive Providence*, in permitting another Perſon to take Poſſeſſion of the Crown: And then I ſay again, That this is not the Senſe of the Convocation, but the contrary; and let any Man read the ſeventeenth Canon of the firſt Book, and he will ſoon be ſatisfied. *If any Man ſhall affirm, That the Kingdom of* Judah *by God's Ordinance going by Succeſſion, when one King was dead, his Heir was not in Right their King, (howbeit by ſome* Athaliah *he might be hindred from enjoying it,) or that the People were not bound without any farther circumſtance, upon ſufficient notice of their former King's death, to have obeyed his Heir apparent, as their Lawfull King, he doth greatly erre.*

P. 14.

From whence there is nothing more plain, than that the Senſe of the Convocation is, That notwithſtanding any Uſurped Poſſeſſion of the Crown, and ſuch as *Athaliah's* was, (*which continued ſome Years,*) the People were *bound* to pay Obedience to the right Heir, as their lawfull King. And then I wonder what becomes of *Poſſeſſion*, and *permiſſive Providence*: And before the Authour can demonſtrate otherwiſe, he muſt firſt demonſtrate this *Canon*, and a great many other things out of the Book. But of this more hereafter.

The third Propoſition is, *That no Violence is to be uſed to Kings for any Irregularities that they commit.* This does not fully expreſs the Senſe of the Convocation, but the Authour's Comment deſtroys it. The Authour, in explaining or proving this Propoſition, ſays, *For the Doctrine of Paſſive Obedience to a Government eſtabliſhed by Law,* (then by the way, there is no *Paſſive Obedience* due to a Government not eſtabliſhed by Law,) *whether the Prince be limited, and ſworn to govern by* Laws *choſen by the People, and enacted with his Conſent, or the Prince be abſolute, and his Will ſufficiently declared, be the* Law, *is of abſolute neceſſity to the Support of any Government.* From whence, it ſeems, that the Authour hath got Mr. *Johnſon's* Paſſive Obedience, and limits it to the *Laws*, and not to the *Prince*: And if ſo, this is not only a plain Contradiction to the Convocation, but to his own extracted Propoſition; for that is, That Kings are to receive no *Violence* from their Subjects for any *Irregularities they commit.* Now though *Irregularities* is a fine word, and not in the Convocation, yet I ſuppoſe the Authour does not mean leſs by it, than a Prince acting and governing againſt Law, eſpecially join'd with that Univerſal, *for any Irregularities they commit.* And then I aſſume, that *Paſſive Obedience* is due to a lawfull Prince, notwithſtanding, and upon his acting and governing againſt Law. And this I am ſure is the Senſe of the Convocation; and if the Authour cannot tell how to extract this *Propoſition*, I have been ſo civil as to extract it for him.

P. 4.

The fourth Propoſition is, *That having ſworn Allegiance to a Prince, we cannot, without the dreadfull Guilt of Perjury, tranſfer our Allegiance, whilſt he continues to have an Authoritative Right and Title to the Crown.* Now I would gladly know, from what place of the Convocation-Book this Propoſition is extracted. The Print refers us to *Canon* 36. but there is nothing in that Canon of Oaths or Allegiance, and therefore that I ſuppoſe is the Errour of the Preſs, and it ſhould be *Can.* 30.

where

where there is something of it, but not one word of the Authour's Limitation *of the Continuance of an Authoritative Right and Title*, but the contrary. Iaddus, *when* Alexander (*having overthrown* Darius) *sent to him to assist him in his Wars, and become Tributary to the* Macedonians, *as he had been to the* Persians; *return'd for Answer, That he might not yield thereto, because he had taken an Oath for his true Allegiance to* Darius, *which he might not lawfully violate whilst* Darius *liv'd*. Now I suppose that *whilst* Darius *liv'd*, is not whilst he continued to have an authoritative Right and Title, and he must have an extraordinary Faculty at *Demonstration*, that can demonstrate them to be the same; and besides, the Convocation supposes that *Darius* had not at that time that authoritative Title the Authour mentions; for they tell us expressly, that this was *when* Darius *was escaped by Flight, after his Army was discomfited*: And therefore once again I desire the Favour, that the Authour would tell me, where he had this *Authoritative Right and Title*; for there is not one word of it in the Convocation Book, nor any thing like it. I know the Authour is resolved to have it, and
P. 5. therefore presently adds, *I say, Authoritative Right and Title*. Well the Authour may say what he please, What is that to me, or to the business? The Question is not what the Authour says, but what the Convocation says. The Authour perhaps may think it better to transfer his Allegiance to any Power, than to be bound up by his Oath; and if he like it, he may enjoy his own humour; but then let him not father this upon the Convocation, and make them say what they never intended, nor
Ibid. thought on. The Authour goes on, *The Case may so happen, that these being separated, the Claim of Right, without the Authority, cannot challenge our Allegiance*. The contrary to which is as expressly delivered and asserted by the Convocation, as any thing can be, as in the Case of *Joash* and *Athaliah*, (*Chap.* and *Can.* 23.) where, notwithstanding *Joash* had none of our Authour's *Authoritative Right and Title*, and had onely *Claim of Right, without the Authority*, "Yet when *Jehoiada* called the "People together, and being acquainted with the Preservation of their "Prince, they all together by a Covenant acknowledged their Allegiance "to him, as unto their lawfull King; and in consequence of that slew *Athaliah* the Usurper. And the Convocation adds, That "In all the process of P. 41, 42. "which action nothing was done which "God himself did not require at their "Hands; and the Reason of this they "give, *Joash*, their late King's Son, "being then their onely natural Lord "and Sovereign, although *Athaliah* "kept him for six Years from the Pos-"session of his Kingdom.

This is plain enough, and needs no farther insisting on; and what Opinion soever our Authour may have of his own Notion, *That the Claim of Right, without the Authority, cannot challenge Allegiance*: Yet I hope he will hereafter be carefull how he ascribes it to the Convocation. I am contented to own with the Authour, That the Case may so happen, that Authority (in the Authour's Sense) and Right may be separated; but the Question is, whether Allegiance may be separated from Right, and transferred to Authority without Right. That the Authour does, but the Convocation never asserted: It is plain in the foregoing Instance, That, according to the Convocation, Right without Authority may and ought to challenge Allegiance; and it is as plain from the same and other Instances, that Authority without Right cannot challenge it. There are indeed some Instances of transferring Allegiance, mentioned and justified in the Convocation Book; and our Authour, and some others, presently conclude from thence,

That

That they juſtifie paying and transferring Allegiance to any Perſon poſſeſſed of Power, though without Right, nay, againſt it. And this is a fundamental Miſtake, and ariſes for want of Conſidering, That in theſe Caſes the Convocation never requires, nor juſtifies the transferring Allegiance, but only where the Right is transferred likewiſe. Thus in the Caſe of *Jehu*, the Convocation
P. 46. expreſly aſſerts, That *Jehu* was the *lawfull* King, and *Joram* was then his Subject; (*i. e.*) the Right was in *Jehu*, and not in *Joram*. So alſo of *Ahud*, when
P. 52. he was authoriſed to kill the King of *Eglon*; he was firſt made a Judge,
P. 53. Prince, and Ruler, and the Convocation ſays expreſly, That "It is not "lawfull for any Perſon whatſoever, "upon pretence of any Revelation, In"ſpiration, or Commandment from "God, either to touch the Perſon of "his Sovereign, or to bear Arms a"gainſt him, except God ſhould firſt "advance the ſaid Perſon from his pri"vate Eſtate, and make him a King. So that 'tis plain, in the ſenſe of the Convocation, there was firſt onely a Right before Allegiance became due, and they challeng'd Allegiance by virtue of that Right. And the ſame may be ſaid of their Submiſſion and Obedience to the *Babylonians*, the *Perſians*, *Macedonians* and the *Romans*, all mentioned and juſtified by the Convocation Book, theſe reſpective Governments had a Right of Government over the *Jews*, though not in the ſame manner with the former by Gods expreſs Nomination, yet they acquired a Right by the Submiſſion and acknowledgment of thoſe, in whom the Right was; And for the Proof of this I ſhall look no farther than our Authour, who tells us expreſly (*pag.* 8, 9.) *That the Kings of* Iſrael *and* Judah, *became not only Tributary but Subjects to the Kings of* Babylon. And then I wonder what the Authour means by Saying upon this Propoſition, (*pag.* 5.) *That the Claim of Right without the Authority cannot challenge Allegiance, as in the Caſe of the Kings of* Iſrael *and* Judah, *that were led Captive by the* Babylonians, *who they ſurvived in* Babylon, *and ſome of them out of Confinement.* For what if they did ſurvive, and whether they were in or out of Confinement, yet, being *Subjects*, what Claim of Right had they? And the Authour himſelf ſays, that, *being Subjects, whatever other duty might, yet Allegiance could no way be due to them*; and what Right ſoever they might have before, by becoming *Subjects*, they had transferred it to the King whoſe *Subjects* they were; and that with the Submiſſion of the People I hope was ſufficient to make a Right in thoſe Princes to that Government, and in conſequence of that Right to make Allegiance to become due: So that however the Authour may contradict himſelf, it is plain in all the Inſtances the Convocation mentions and juſtifies, Allegiance followed Right, and not merely poſſeſſion, or (as our Authour calls it) Authority.

It is objected from *Joſephus*, (L. 11. C. 8.) *That* (*whatever he might anſwer*) Jaddus *actually became a Subject to* Alexander *while* Darius *was alive, and alſo before he was totally and finally ſubdued: For* Joſephus *tells us, that after the taking of* Tyre, Alexander *being diſpleaſed with* Jaddus's *Anſwer, came directly to* Jeruſalem, *upon whoſe approach* Jaddus *in his Pontifical Attire meets him, and ſubmits to him, and* Alexander, *inſtead of executing his revenge, falls down before him, as having in a Viſion at* Dio *ſeen a Perſon ſo attired*, &c.

To this I anſwer,

I. That the Story it ſelf is very ſuſpitious.

II. If it were true, it would not prove what it is alledged for.

1. The Story is very ſuſpitious, upon theſe two Accounts:

1. No Authour, beſides *Joſephus*, and thoſe that had it from him, mentions or takes notice of any ſuch thing. There is not the leaſt foottſtep of it in *Diodorus Siculus*, or *Plutarch*, or *Quintus Curtius*, or *Arian*, or *Juſtin*, all very good and diligent Hiſtorians; and (to ſay the Truth of them) every one of them a more creditable Authour than *Joſephus*. *Diodorus Siculus* was much nearer the time, and wrote 160 years before *Joſephus*, and each of them gives a punctual account of the whole Progreſs of *Alexander*, and yet not one word of *Jaddus*, or *Jeruſalem*. Now if it were true, as *Joſephus* records, it is as memorable a paſſage as any in the whole Expedition; and it is a ſtrange thing, that thoſe who are ſo punctual as to tell us of his wanting Sleep, of his Dreams, and of his taking Phyſick, ſhould yet pretermit, and ſilently paſs over a thing every way ſo remarkable. And what is yet more ſtrange, if *Joſephus* be in the right, they tell us the clean contrary, *viz.* That from the Siege of *Tyre* *Alexander* went directly to *Gaza*, and ſo on into *Ægypt*, to the Temple of *Jupiter Hamon*, and ſo from place to place, till he came to *Gaugomela*, where he fought the laſt Battle with *Darius*.

2. The Difficulty of reconciling it with Chronology. *Joſephus* tells us, *That* Manaſſes *the younger Brother of* Jaddus, *married the Daughter of* Sanballat, *and for which* Jaddus *depoſed him from the Prieſthood, and* Sanballat *for to encourage him, by leave obtained from* Alexander, *built a Temple in* Samaria, *and made* Manaſſes *High Prieſt*. Now *Sanballat* was Prefect of *Syria*, and Governour of the *Samaritans*, when *Nehemiah* built the Walls of *Jeruſalem*, and diſturbed the Building, *&c.* This was the 20th Year of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*. Now from the 20th Year of *Artaxerxes*, to the taking of *Tyre*, is 115 Years, and it is thus computed:

Neh. 2. 19. 4. 1. 6. 1. 2. 1.

	Years.
Artaxerxes Longimanus reigned	41
Darius Nothus	19
Artaxerxes Mnemon	43
Ochus	23
Arſes	3
Darius Codomanus	6
	135

From which ſubtract 20 of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, and there remains 115. Now as *Calviſius* obſerves, the Government of *Syria* and *Samaria*, being a Place of great Authority and Truſt, *Sanballat*, when the Government was conferred upon him, could not be a young Man, but of good Years and Experience; and the leaſt we can ſuppoſe him to be at the beginning of his Government, (and how long that might be before *Nehemiah*'s going up to *Jeruſalem*, the Scripture is ſilent; but it is certain, that it was before,) is of the Age of 30. And add this to the former Account,

	115
	30
	145

And then *Sanballat* at that Time muſt be One hundred fourty and five years old.

And it is to be obſerv'd, that this is the ſhorteſt Computation, and I believe the trueſt. Thoſe who reckon *Sogdianus*, and a ſecond *Xerxes*, as Kings of *Perſia*, make it yet longer. And *Jaddus* and *Manaſſes* could not be much younger: For that *Nehemiah* (*Ch.* 13. *ver.* 21.) takes notice of this Marriage with the Daughter of *Sanballat*, and (*Ch.* 12. *ver.* 22.) intimates *Iaddus*'s then being High Prieſt. Now *Brietius* tells us, That *Nehemiah* dyed the laſt Year

Year of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, and from the Death of *Artaxerxes*, to the taking of *Tyre*, as appears by the Computation, is 94 Years. Now how long *Nehemiah* wrote his Book before he dy'd does not appear; nor is it certain how old *Iaddus* and *Manasses* then were: But it is plain, That *Manasses*, the younger Brother, was then married; and 'tis probable *Iaddus* was then High-Priest, and I think the least we can allow for the time of *Nehemiah*'s living, after he ended his Book, and for the marriageable Age of *Manasses*, and then for *Iaddus*'s Age, as elder than him, the least we can allow is 30 Years, and it is very probable it was much more. To this add 94, the former Computation, and then *Iaddus*, at that time *Josephus* fastens this Story, must have been 124 Years old.

Annal. ad An. Mun. 3629.

And this is the least and lowest account: But if we take *Josephus* his Computation, it will be yet much longer; for he tells us *Nehemiah* built the Walls of *Jerusalem* the 28*th* Year of *Xerxes*, and dyed some time after. And then from the Death of *Xerxes*, accounting 10, it will be 41 years more, even all the time of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*, and then *Iaddus* must have been One hundred sixty and five Years old.

Antiq. l. 11.

Years.
41
124
165

These are Difficulties that have perplexed all Chronologers, and some finding it impossible to reconcile it, have been tempted to reject this Story of *Iaddus* and *Sanballat*, as a mere Invention of *Josephus*.

There are but two things said, that will make this Account of *Josephus* so much as probable; but both of them are as unaccountable as *Josephus* himself. Some, as *Calvisius*, &c. set the going of *Nehemiah* to *Jerusalem* sixty Years forwards in the Reign of *Artaxerxes Mnemon*: But all those that do so, fix the Time of finishing the second Temple (to make their Account hang together,) not in the Reign of *Darius Hystaspis*, but of *Darius Nothus*. But this (besides that it is against the Judgment of *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Eusebius*, and all Chronologers till *Scaliger*,) instead of clearing one Difficulty, it makes more and greater: For if the second Temple was finished in the Reign of *Darius Nothus*, then *Ezra*, and all those that saw the first Temple, and surviv'd the building of the second, must have been at least 180 Years old; and then also *Zerubbabel* and *Jeshua* must have lived to 145 Years. The Compute is thus: The Temple of *Solomon* was destroyed in the Eleventh Year of *Zedechiah*, and that was eleven Years after the beginning of the *Babylonish* Captivity. The Captivity lasted 70 Years, and all agree that these 70 Years ended some time in the Reign of *Cyrus*, and probably three Years before his Death. Now from those 3 years of *Cyrus*, to the 6*th* of *Darius Nothus*, in which (saith *Calvisius*, and those that follow that Account) the second Temple was finished, is 115 Years.

	Years.
Cyrus	3
Cambyses	7
Inter. Mag.	1
Darius Hystaspis	36
Xerxes	21
Artax. Longim.	41
Darius Nothus	6
	115

To this add 59 years of the Captivity, and 6 years to a Child to lodge any thing in his memory: and then *Ezra* and the rest must have been of the age of 180.

Years.
115
59
6
180

Compare 2 Kin. 25. 18. 21. and Ezra 2. 1.

Now that *Ezra* was living at the Deſtruction of the firſt Temple appears; for that his Father *Seraiah* was then ſlain by *Nebuchadnezzar*. And that ſeveral others, who ſaw the firſt Temple, and were returned from Captivity, and living at the building the ſecond, is evident from the Prophet *Haggai*, Ch. 2. ver. 3. *Who is left among you that ſaw this Houſe in her firſt Glory? And how do ye ſee it now? Is it not in your Eyes in compariſon of it as nothing?* *Calviſius* takes notice of this, pretending to anſwer it, by ſaying, that theſe words do not mean, as if any one that had ſeen *Solomon's* Temple was then alive; but they are ſo to be taken, as if he had ſaid, *If*, or *Oh that any of you had ſeen*, &c. in the ſame manner that our Saviour's Words are to be underſtood, *What man among you, having an hundred Sheep*, &c. and that they might collect the largeneſs of the Temple from the Foundations of it, and from the compaſs of Mount *Moria*. As if the Prophet had onely ſpoken a Parable to them, or as if by ſeeing the *Glory*, he only meant the *Rubbiſh*: Whereas 'tis plain, that the Prophet does not mean ſight in Imagination and alluſively, but actual ſeeing, and ſuch as whereby they might compare one with the other, *Is it not in your Eyes in compariſon of it as nothing?* and how could that be, except their *Eyes* had ſeen the Glory of the firſt Temple, as well as the meanneſs of that they then ſaw? And why ſhou'd the ſame word (*ſee*,) and relating alſo to the comparing one object of Sight with another, in the ſame line, be underſtood in two different ſenſes, in a metaphorical and a proper ſenſe; and if not, then they actually, and in a proper ſenſe ſaw the Temple in her firſt Glory, as they did ſee it in the mean condition it then was. And this is the ſenſe of all the Interpreters I have met with, and particularly of St. *Hierom*, (*in locum.*) And the Prophet plainly ſeems to refer to that of Ezra, Ch. 3. ver. 12. and which was but 12 or 13 Years before, *The Prieſts and Fathers that were ancient Men, and had ſeen the firſt Houſe, when the Foundation of this Houſe was laid before their Eyes, wept with a loud voice, and many ſhouted aloud for joy.* And this I hope is not a Scene in the Fancy, or merely ſeing the Foundations: For why ſhould the ſight of the *Rubbiſh* ſo mightily affect them? Or what need the mention of *ancient Men*? Or what could be the Reaſon of that great difference, that ſome ſhould weep with a loud Voice, and others ſhout for joy, for all ſaw the Foundations alike; and the young Men ſaw them as well as the ancient Prieſts and Fathers. It is plain therefore, That ſome of thoſe that were at the building of the ſecond Temple, ſaw the firſt Temple in its Glory, and while it ſtood; but then it is as plain, that the ſecond Temple was finiſh'd in the Reign of *Darius Hyſtaſpis*, and conſequently that *Ezra* and *Nehemiah* went up to *Jeruſalem*, not in the Reign of *Artaxerxes Mnemon*, but of *Artaxerxes Longimanus*; and then it will follow, that if *Sanballat* liv'd to the time of *Alexander*, he muſt at the Siege of *Tyre* have been 145 years old.

Ibid. P. 151.

But however *Calviſius* thought he had got an Anſwer to that of *Haggai*; yet the caſe of *Zerubbabel* and *Joſhua* perplexes him, and he does not know what to ſay to it: For it is plain that *Zerubbabel* and *Joſhuah* (the one as Governour, the other as High Prieſt) went up to *Jeruſalem* upon the Edict of *Cyrus*, and continued in their reſpective Stations till the Temple was finiſhed, and probably ſome time after; but if that

Zach 4. 9.

that Temple was not finish'd 'till the 6th. of *Darius Nothus* then both *Zerubbabel* and *Jeshua* must have been of the Age of 145. which is the same difficulty with *Sanballat*; for from the Edict of *Cyrus* to the 6th. of *Darius Nothus* is, as appears before, 115 years; and to this add 30, as a Competent age to qualifie them for such great Offices, and that makes 145.

Magna est hæc distantia, cujus exemplum par in nulla alia historia dari potest. Ibid. 141.

Calvisius plainly confesseth, That this is a great distance, and that there is not the like Example in any other History. I know *Scaliger* makes nothing of it, as if it had been a very ordinary matter for men to live so long; but for all that it would have puzzled him, to have given but a few Instances; and those that have been they are famous, and as much taken notice of by Historians, as great Prodigies; and that also (like our old *Parr*) though it be of Men of the most private condition and extraction, and much more if it were of Princes and Governours; and yet neither *Josephus* himself, nor any other Historian takes the least notice either of *Zerubbabel* or *Jeshua*, or of *Sanballat*, *Nehemiah*, or *Iaddus*, living to any wonderful Age. And this I think is another prejudice to the Story.

Animadv. in Euseb. *Chron. p.* 90.

But there is one thing more, and which I take to be full out as wonderful, and that is, that *Zerubbabel* should continue Governour of the Jews (as he must do, if *Calvisius* be in the right) under 7 Successive Kings of *Persia*, and these of such differing Tempers and Inclinations, and especially with respect to the Affairs of *Judæa*; such instances are as rare in the World, and perhaps more rare, than for a Man to live to 150 or 200 Years. This Chronologers and Historians (as far as my reading serves) do not take notice of, and yet I think it perplexes the Cause as much, and is as hardly to be reconcil'd to the common Observations among Men, as such wonderful long lives.

These are difficulties that are not easily reconcil'd; and therefore some take another way, and suppose that there were 2 *Sanballats*, and 2 *Iadduses* one in the time of *Nehemiah*, and the other of *Alexander*; but besides that, *Josephus*, nor no other History intimate any such thing: It would be one of the strangest accidents in the World; for to make the Story compleat, you must not only suppose two *Sanballats*, and two *Iadduses*, but that each of the *Iadduses* had a Brother, which Married the Daughter of each of the *Sanballats*, and for which respectively they were depos'd from the Priesthood. Now such a concurrence of all circumstances is like the *Platonick* year; and is not likely to return sooner. Or if such a strange thing should happen, is it probable that all Histories would have been silent of it?

And all this plainly shews, with what difficulties this matter is clogg'd, and how perplex'd Chronologers have been with it; and the consequence is, that it is very unreasonable to make an Argument of, or draw any inference in reference to practice from such a doubtful and suspitious Story. For if it will not be granted (as I suppose it will not very easily) that there were 2 such *Sanballats*, *Iadduses*, *Daughters*, and *Brothers*, if it will not be granted that *Ezra*, and those that surviv'd the Captivity and the Building the second Temple, liv'd to above 180 years, or that *Zerubbabel* and *Jeshua*, liv'd each of them to near 150, and (which is all out as strange) that *Zerubbabel* and *Jeshua* continued Governour and High Priest under 7 successive Kings of *Persia*; or if it will not be granted that *Sanballat* liv'd to above 145, and *Iaddus* himself to above 124, and all these mighty Ages not in the least mentioned by any Historian, then it will follow that the Story of *Sanballat* and *Iaddus*, with respect to the Times of *Alexander*, is a mistake in *Josephus*.

And it is farther to be obſerv'd that, the placing of *Sanballat* and *Iaddus* to the Times of *Alexander*, is a main ground of this perplexity among Chronologers, whereas had they rejected *Joſephus's* Authority in this, as they do in other matters relating to the *Perſian* Monarchy, they would not have been put upon ſuch difficulties, as to allot ſuch mighty Ages to particular Men.

Hiſtorias in utraque parte adeo manifeſtas eſſe, ut neceſſe ſit in utraque ſententia alterutrius horum vel Jeſuæ & Zorobabeli, *vel* Nehemiæ & Sanballeti, *tantam ætatem concedere, quæ major ſit annis centum & quadraginta.* Ibid. *p.* 149.

Calviſius ſays, *That the Hiſtories on both ſides (i. e.* the Account of *Joſephus*, and his own) *are ſo manifeſt, that whoever takes either of them, it is neceſſary to aſſign either to* Jeſhuah *and* Zerubbabel, *or to* Nehemiah *and* Sanballat, *an Age of above* 140 *Years.* And this is true enough, if *Joſephus* his Account be admitted; but if it be rejected, then there would be no need of making Men live to ſuch prodigious Ages, to fill up the ſpaces. Let it be but granted that *Joſephus* is out in his Account of *Sanballat* and *Iaddus*, (as he is notoriouſly in other matters relating to thoſe times;) and then the Times would be computed by more moderate and accountable Ages. And the Jewiſh Chronologers do not only condemn *Joſephus* in other matters, but in this very particular they affirm, That the Temple on Mount *Gitiæum* was built long before the Times of *Alexander*; and that all the time of *Alexander Simeon juſtus* was High Prieſt: Now *Simeon juſtus* was the Son of *Onias*, and the Grandſon of *Iaddus*.

Chronologia David Ganz. *edita per* Vorſtium. *pag.* 287. 246. 59.

And (to ſay no more) we have the Judgments of two very conſiderable Authours, and who were not at all concerned in the preſent Controverſie, and which I ſuppoſe was never before ſtarted. Our excellent *Lydiat*, ſpeaking of *Sanballat*, ſaith, *Either this was another from him that was Father in Law to one of the Sons of* Joiada, *whom* Nehemiah *mentions, or elſe* Joſephus *is equally falſe and contrary to himſelf, in determining the Age in which* Sanballat *liv'd, as he is in almoſt all the Chronology of the* Perſian *Monarchy.*

Nimirum aut hic alius fuit ab eo unius filiorum Joiadæ *filii* Eliaſhibi *Socero, cujus meminit* Nehem. *cap. ult. aut æque falſus, & ſibi ipſi contrarius eſt* Joſephus, *in definiendo Sæculo* Sanballeti, *ac in pleraque alia Chronologia Monarchiæ Perſicæ.* De Emendat. Temp. *p.* 65.

Johannes Temporarius in his Chronology, *l.* 3. *p.* 197. ſpeaking of this matter, ſays, *That* Iaddus *and* Sanballat, *which are ſpoken of by* Joſephus, *either they are divers from thoſe mentioned by* Ezra; *or, which I rather ſuſpect, they are the moſt vain Fictions of* Joſephus *himſelf, concerning* Iaddus *and* Sanballat.

Iaddus & Sanballatus, *qui in Hiſtoria* Joſephi *recenſentur, aut alii ſunt ab iis qui ab* Ezdra *memorantur, vel, quod magis ſuſpicor, vaniſſima ſunt* Joſephi *Commenta de* Iaddo & Sanballate.

But beſides theſe Difficulties in Chronology, there are ſeveral Inconſiſtencies in the Story it ſelf, noted by *Saliam*, as that the *Phœnicians* and *Chaldæans*, who followed *Alexander*, thought to have plundered the City; and how ſhould he have *Chaldæans* in his Army, when as yet he had not taken *Babylon*, nor come near to *Chaldæa*? *Joſephus* a little after ſays, that the Jews beſought *Alexander*, that he would ſuffer the Jews who lived about *Babylon* and *Media*, to uſe their own Laws and Rites; and which he freely granted: Whereas at that time he had not conquered *Babylon*, nor *Media*, nor ſo much as been at them. He tells us that the Army was aſtoniſhed to ſee *Alexander* worſhip *Iaddus*; and *Parmenio* asked him, how he that was adored by all, ſhould himſelf now adore the High-Prieſt of the Jews; whereas at that time *Alexander* never thought of being ador'd, or did believe himſelf the Son of *Jupiter*, that Madneſs came upon him firſt in *Ægypt*, and which was not till a year after. *An. Mund.* 3722.

And now does any man think, that a Sto-

a Story that is thus clogg'd, with ſo many, and thoſe inſuperable Difficulties, fit to make an Argument of, or that any regular Inference, or Concluſion can be drawn from thence in reference to our practices, eſpecially in a matter of ſuch mighty weight and concernments, as that which is before us? It is worth the while to obſerve the account *Calviſius* gives us of *Joſephus*, and his Hiſtory of thoſe Times. *They that reſt upon the Authority of* Joſephus, *ſtand upon a very ſlippery and weak Foundation.* And farther adds, *When* Joſephus *is ſo much out concerning theſe times, who can ſafely give Credit to what he aſſerts?* Now this Story of *Iaddus* and *Alexander*, and the aſſigning of *Sanballat* and *Iaddus* to that time, ſtand purely upon the Authority of *Joſephus*, and not only ſo, but in a manner contrary to much better authority; But however, if that Authority (in matters relating to thoſe times) be not ſufficient to be rely'd on, then it follows, that the Story of *Iaddus* is not to be depended on; and ſtanding upon a Foundation ſo ſlippery and infirm, is not of ſuffiocient Authority to be drawn into an Argument. And it is not onely *Calviſius*, but all Chronologers give us the ſame Character of *Joſephus*; and his Errours and Miſtakes concerning thoſe times are ſo many and groſs, as would make any man, that acted upon Principles of Sincerity, very fearfull to uſe an Example taken out of him, in matters of Practice; for however Chronologers may diſpute, and whatever Arguments may be raiſed in matters of leſs moment, yet when it comes to a point of Conſcience, Men that have a care of their Souls, will hardly venture to act upon one ſingle Example, and that alſo vouch'd but by a ſingle and ſuſpitious Authority. An Argument from Example is at beſt but a poor one; but it muſt be very poor indeed, when the Example it ſelf is doubtfull. The Practice of the High Prieſt in that corrupt State of the Jewiſh Church, will not ſignifie much to us, and no more in this than in their other Immoralities; and *Iaddus* becoming a ſubject to *Alexander*, contrary to his Oath, is no more a Pattern for us to follow, than *Eliaſib's* building a Chamber in the Temple for *Tobiah*, is an argument for us to act contrary to the expreſs Laws of God: But then it muſt needs ſignifie much leſs, when that Practice wants ſufficient Clearneſs and Evidence to prove it. Neh. 13. 4.

Qui Authoritate Joſephi *nituntur, illi infiſtunt Fundamento valde lubrico & infirmo.* Et paulo poſt, *Cum circa hæc tempora* Joſephus *ita aberret, quis tuto ipſius aſſertioni fidem præbere poteſt?* Ibid. p. 148.

If it be ſaid here, *That whether the Story be true or no, the Convocation ſeems to believe it, and have inſerted part of it into the Convocation Book; and it is not the matter of Fact, but their Senſe we are enquiring into:* I ſay ſo too; but I ſay likewiſe, That their Senſe is not to be extended beyond their words, nor are they to be made Parties to any more of the Story than they have inſerted in their Book.

They mention and thereby approve *Iaddus's* Anſwer to *Alexander*, that he had ſworn Allegiance to *Darius*; and therefore could not violate his Oath ſo long as *Darius* liv'd. And from thence we may conclude, that their Senſe is, That an Oath of Allegiance was binding to a Prince, ſo long as he lived, and had not given up his Right, though he was beaten in the Field, and fled before his Enemies.

But for the other part of the ſtory of *Iaddus* ſubmitting to *Alexander* while *Darius* was living, the Convocation takes no Notice of it, nor does it any where appear, that they thought *Darius* was then living; and therefore from thence nothing can be concluded as to their Senſe.

And I ask thoſe who from the inſtance of *Iaddus* urge Submiſſion to a Poſſeſſor of Power, notwithſtanding an Oath

Oath to a lawful King, who is alive, and inſiſts upon his Right. Whether they argue from the Story, or from the Convocation Book? If from the Story, it is falſe, or at leaſt ſuſpitious. If from the Convocation Book, they ſay nothing of it. And if there be nothing in the Premiſſes, there muſt be likewiſe nothing in the concluſion. But,

2. Grant the ſtory true, it is not to the purpoſe it is urg'd for. *Joſephus* tells us that God appeared to *Iaddus* in a Dream, and warn'd him to ſubmit to *Alexander*, and to meet him in that Solemn manner he did. So that this is a ſingular and exempt Caſe, and falls within the Circumſtances of *Jehu* and *Abud*.

If it be ſaid, *That Prophecy at that time was departed from the Jewiſh Church, and therefore they could not have any Revelation.*

I anſwer, That *Haggai* and *Zacharias*, and after them *Malachi*, prophecied in the time of the ſecond Temple, and it is generally concluded for the ſpace of 40 Years. And after them they had an inferiour degree of Prophecy, which laſted for a long time, as the *Bath Kol.* and probably ſome other ways, as by Dreams, &c.

It was always the Cuſtom in the Jewiſh Church, in Caſes of great Extremity and Emergency, to have recourſe to God for ſome expreſs Revelation, what they ſhould do. And here *Joſephus* tells us, were all the Preparations to it: They faſted and prayed, and the next night God appeared to *Iaddus*, (however as we have the Story from *Joſephus*, ſo we muſt take it all from him, and he tells expreſly, that God appeared to *him*,) and ordered him ſo to doe, and God's appearing and Command ſtands upon the ſame Authority with all the reſt of the Story. And then it is wholly beſides the purpoſe it is alleadged for: For there is a wide difference between acting by common and ſtanding Rules, and by expreſs Revelation: and if theſe Gentlemen will ſhew us any expreſs Revelation for what they doe, as *Iaddus* had, then they ſay ſomething; but till they can ſhew that, this Example of *Iaddus*, if it were true, will doe them no Service.

I now come to conſider the firſt Propoſition, which (*page* 3.) ſtands thus: *That the Power of Kings was originally Patriarchal, deriv'd from God, and not from the People.* But when the Authour comes to repeat it, (*p.* 6.) he makes another thing of it: *That Government in general, whether Monarchy, or any other Form, derives its Authority from God, the Author of Nature, and conſequently of humane Society, and not from the People, (though their Conſent be ordinarily neceſſary to the Conſtitution both of the Form of Government, and the Perſons governing,* &c.) Now whether the Authour, who undertakes to demonſtrate things out of the Convocation Book that never were there, will alſo undertake to demonſtrate, that theſe two are one and the ſame Propoſition. But for my part, I am diſappointed: For finding the firſt Propoſition mentioned, I thought (to ſave the Readers pains and my own, and to prevent needleſs repetition) to have conſidered the ſame Propoſition in both places at once. But I am miſtaken: For though the Authour calls them both the firſt Propoſition, they are no more like one another, than an Apple is like an Oyſter; and it would have been more to the purpoſe, to have called the one the firſt Propoſition, and the other the laſt.

And as to the firſt of the firſt Propoſitions, I have onely this now to obſerve: That the Authour by his Expoſition of it hath expounded away the Senſe of the Convocation, as he allways does: For (ſaith he *pag.* 3.) *Though Kings are or ought to be bound up, and limited*

limited in the Exercise of their Power by Laws. By what Laws, I pray? And who ought to bind them up? Why could not this be expressed in the words of the Convocation, and which the Authour refers to, *Ch.* 15? which are these; *It is manifest in the Scriptures, That the Kings in the old Testament were as strictly bound to the Observation of God's Laws in their Government, as* Moses, *&c.*

And it sounds a little harsh to say that God *ought* to bind them up, and limit them, and by the Authour's disjunctive, *are or ought to be bound up.* It is plain he means what the Convocation does not, for all Princes, whether absolute or not, are already, and ever were strictly bound to the Observation of God's Laws in their Government. He is their superiour, and to him onely they are accountable; but their Power being deriv'd from God, and not from the People, they are not accountable to them for any Exercise of that Power, whether they exercise it justly or unjustly. And this is the sense of the Convocation; and this, if the Authour had pleased, he might have deduc'd from his Proposition, and much more naturally, than by troubling his Readers with an impertinent Rout about Absoluteness, and the Conceits of it.

I am at length come to that which the Author says is *the Groundwork of the whole Discourse.* And that is the last of his first Propositions. And here I will not much trouble my self with the Repugnances and Disagreements between this and his first Proposition, which notwithstanding he calls the same. He tells us here *that Government in general* (and that I am sure is not Patriarchal; for that is a particular Kind of it) *whether Monarchy, or any other form,* (and that also is not Patiarchal, nor originally Patriarchal, but a Corruption of it, and deviation from it,) *derives it's Authority from God, the Authour of Nature, and consequently of humane Society.* What the Authour means by these last words I connot tell; they are not in the Convocation, and I suspect he hath some bad meaning in them. They seem to intimate as if God was the Authour of Government no otherwise than as he is the Authour of Nature, (I suppose he means humane Nature.) And having made Mankind of a sociable Nature, by that they were directed to societie, and from that to Government. For he says God the Authour of Nature, and *consequently,* (*i. e.*) consequential to that Nature of Humane Society. And if this be his meaning, it is not only a perfect Contradiction to the whole Stream of the Convocation-Book, but to his own first Proposition, which tells us, *That Government was originally Patriarchal.* It follows in the Authour, *and not from the People, (though their Consent be ordinarily necessary to the Constitution, both of the Form of Government, and the Persons governing.)* Now we must remember again, that the Authour says, *he hath extracted these Propositions out of the Convocation Book.* Sure he hath got a Convocation Book of his own, which no Body ever saw but himself; for all the Books we have deliver the clean contrary, almost in every Page. If the Authour thinks the People Consent ordinarily necessary to the Constitution both of the Form and Persons, it is plain the Convocation never thought so, but the contrary. And if he please he may dispute the Point against them. But he must not impose upon us, and make us believe that he demonstrates out of the Convocation, when he delivers things the most contrary to what they do.

Well, at last however, through all the Authour's Shuffings and Intermixings, we are got to this Point, *That Government derives its Power from God, and not from the People.* And what I

pray does this Demonſtrate? a Man would imagine that this demonſtrated, That Kings held only of God, That the People of all ſorts and Ranks had nothing to do with the Government, nor could call Kings to account for their Adminiſtrations. And ſo indeed the Convocation concludes, but the Authour had no mind to meddle with that. But forſooth *from the right Reverend the Authour he obſerves* Three things.

P. 6. And is not this an admirable way of giving the Senſe of an Authour to put ſome of his words into Propoſitions, and then to give us the ſenſe of thoſe Propoſitions, not from the Places where they are mentioned, nor from the Inferences or Concluſions the Authour himſelf draws from them, but by Obſerving ſomething, and that differing from the Author's Senſe in ſome other parts of his Book. At this rate a Man may extract Chalk from Cheeſe, or any thing out of any thing. Well, but what is it that this Authour obſerves,

He obſerves.

That all Kingdoms are now (what was more peculiarly appropriated to the Jewiſh *Nation) in their firſt Concluſion in ſome ſort* Theocracies. Now the Authour may obſerve this, if he pleaſe; but to ſay that he obſerves this from the *Right Reverend the Authour*, is like all the reſt; for *the Right Reverend the Authour* obſerves no ſuch thing at all, This Authour obſerves, That *now* all Kingdoms are in a ſort *Theocracies*: But this is his own *peculiar* Obſervation, and I doubt he will find it hard to obſerve this not only from the Right Reverend Authour, but even from any other, for by that the Convocation and all Men elſe hitherto have underſtood, God's Governing the Jews in a peculiar manner, immediately by himſelf, and diſtinct from other Nations. And does not the Authour ſay, *it was more peculiarly appropriated to the Jewiſh Nation.* And how will he reconcile that to all Nations? But we live in an Age where all our old Standards are thrown down, and new ones raiſed in their room; we have had a new Notion of Allegiance, a new Notion of Succeſſion, and a new Notion of Right and Wrong; and now our Authour gives us a new Notion of *Theocracy*, by which he means God's Permiſſive Providence; and any Man that God permits to get the Poſſeſſion of Power in other Kingdoms, he has as good a Title to the Peoples Allegiance, as if he had been (among the Jews) expreſſly conſtituted a Ruler and Governour by God himſelf, and as particularly named, as *Moſes*, *Joſhua*, or any of the Judges. For having cited out of the Convocation, That God being the Lord of the World, and in the Government of it, uſeth the Miniſtry of Civil Magiſtrates, as well in other Countries as among his own peculiar People *Iſrael*. And that he holds himſelf the Helm of every Kingdom, and uſeth their Services in ſuch ſort, as to Exerciſe his own juſt Judgments, Will, and good Pleaſure. P. 83. 84.

Now (ſaith the Authour) *This he does by reſerving to his Providence the Prerogative of Deſignation of the Perſon whom he intends for his Vicegerent.* P. 7. Now by this the Authour does not mean Providence proceeding according to Legal Right and Juſtice; or if he does, it is not to his purpoſe; and yet all this may be done, and not a Tittle of any Man's ſingle Right violated. But Providence permitting the Poſſeſſion of Power, contrary to all Law and Right among Men; and to make ſuch a Providence the Foundation of Obedience, and which is more, of tranſferring Allegiance, notwithſtanding the moſt Sacred Engagements to the contrary, is a moſt abſurd and ungodly Doctrine, as will appear preſently.

In the mean time, the Authour is very unfortunate in proving his Principles. For to prove that Providence deſigns

designs the Person of the Sovereign *in other Kingdoms* (as well as in *Judah*,) he instances the disappointment of *Adonijah*, *Solomon's* Elder Brother; as if he did not know that this was done in the Kingdom of *Israel*, and that *Solomon* was design'd King in the room of *David* not by Providence, but by God's express Nomination.

P. 8. Well, for all that on goes our Authour, and proves it from another instance in the Kingdom of *Israel*, and by God's express appointment; as the Case of *Rehoboam*, and *Jeroboam*, and the rending of the Ten Tribes. And not content with these, he tells us farther, *That the History of the Kings of* Israel *amply Testify, how God had extinguished the Line Royal, and advanced to the Crown such as had no relation to it.* And are not these now pure Proofs of a *Theocracy in other Kingdoms*? And that God by his Providence designs the Persons of his Vicegerents in *other Nations* as well as *Israel*; for that was the Authour's first Observation? Well, it may be he might *observe* it in other Kingdoms, but he hath only *prov'd* it in the Kingdom of *Judah*. But I must not let his instance of *Rehoboam* pass, to which the Authour thus delivers:

God sometimes, for the only design'd Usurpation of a Prince, whose Title, and that in an Hereditary Kingdom, was altogether indisputable, does deprive him of the Government in part or whole, and will not allow him so much as to endeavour the regaining it, which was the Case of Rehoboam. There are two things deserve Reflection. The one is that *Rehoboam's* not regaining the Ten Tribes was expressly forbidden by God, and so nothing to our Authour's purpose. But had he not had that express Prohibition, might he not then have endeavoured to regain them, notwithstanding any *Providential Permission* of *Jeroboam's* possessing himself of them? This is the Case, and I think neither the Authour nor any body else will deny but he might. And then it follows that the permission of Providence is no Rule for Acquiescence or Submission to those Persons whom Providence permits to possess themselves of Power.

The other is a foul prevarication of Scripture. The Authour says, that God depriv'd *Rehoboam* of his Government for his *only design'd Usurpation.* Whereas the Scripture is as Express as can be, that it was for the Idolatry of his Father *Solomon*. I Confess I the less wonder that he prevaricates with the Convocation, that can make thus bold with the Scripture it self. Compare 1 Kin. 12. 15. and 11. 11, 33.

From the whole Observation the Authour says, *All that I will note hence is, that the Line of Descent in an Hereditary Kingdom may be interrupted, and yet the Law of Succession not violated.* Not violated? That is one of the strangest things in the World; not violated in the Case of *Jeroboam*? nor violated when the Authour says, such were advanc'd to the Crown who had no *Relation* to it? Perhaps the Authour may say, it cannot properly be said, That God by so doing, did violate the Law of Succession. But he may observe that the reason of that is, because God is above the Law, and not ty'd to observe it, and so he does not violate, what he has no Obligation to observe. In the mean while the Law is not kept, and no Man can say that the Law of Succession was observ'd, when *Jeroboam*, or others, that had no Relation to the Regal Line were advanc'd to the Crown: And all that I shall note hence is, That the Authour extracts *Notes*, with as little Fairness, as he does *Propositions*.

His second Remark is, *That a Sovereign may be divested of his Power which he received from God, and decline into the inferiour Condition of a Subject.* Very well: But the Question is how this may be? And the Convocation tells us, two ways: —— P. 8.

When

When God expreſly nominates and appoints another Perſon to be King, as in the caſe of *Jehu* and *Ahud*. Or by the Submiſſion and Acknowledgment of thoſe in whom the Right was, as in the Caſe of *Ariſtobulus*, and his Sons. Theſe
P. 77. are all the Convocation mentions, and to doe the Authour Right, theſe are all that he extracts out of them in this Obſervation. And let the Authour take which he pleaſe, or both of them, and make his beſt of them.

3. His third Remarke is, *That when a Prince is thus diveſted of his Power from God, and another advanc'd to his throne, our Legal Allegiance may juſtly be Claimed by the Poſſeſſour.*

Now let us connect the ſecond Remark with this, and they run thus: That a Sovereign may be diveſted of his Power and decline into the inferiour condition of a Subject. And when he is *thus* diveſted (*i. e.*) when he declines into the inferiour condition of a Subject, why then I know nothing to the contrary, but Allegiance may be transferred to the Prince whoſe Subject he is. And if the Authour pleaſe to demonſtrate, that one in the world is a Subject, or a Subject in the preſent Government, he may ſave himſelf the labour of any other Demonſtration: But 'til, he does that, all his Demonſtrations are beſides the Cuſhion. For though he produces the Convocation with a great deal of confidence we ſhall find upon examining it, that it will by no means ſerve his turn, nor in the leaſt prove what he deſigns by it, nor any way countenance ſuch Submiſſion as the Authour pleads for.

P. 10. The mighty Place is this, *Ch.* 28. *p.* 57. The Convocation, taking notice of the variation of Governments in the World, hath theſe words. "And when having "attain'd their ungodly deſires, (whe-"ther Ambitious Kings, by bringing "any Country into their Subjection; or "diſloyal Subjects, by their Rebellious "Riſing againſt their natural Sove-"reign,) they have Eſtabliſh'd any of "the ſaid *degenerate Forms of Govern-"ment* amongſt their People; the "Authority either ſo unjuſtly gotten, "or wrung by force from the true "and lawful Poſſeſſour, being always "God's Authority, (and therefore re-"ceiving no impeachment by the wick-"edneſs of thoſe that have it,) is ever "(when any ſuch alterations are through-"ly ſettled) to be reverenced and obey-"ed, and the People of all ſorts, as well "of the Clergy, as of the Laity, are to "be ſubject unto it, not only for fear, "but alſo for Conſcience ſake.

Upon which the Authour ſaith, *All that can be moved hereupon is, when a Government may be ſaid to be ſettled.* If the Author pleaſeth he may put it into the words of the Convocation, and that is (more than mere ſettled) *throughly ſettled.*

And to reſolve that Queſtion our Authour adds, *And with ſubmiſſion I can't but conceive, that the Government is ſettled when the Crown, with all it's Dignities, Prerogatives, Adminiſtrations, Authorities, Revenues, &c. are generally recognis'd, and perſonally enjoy'd; which muſt be ſuppoſed to be when all Places of Power and Truſt, of Royalty and Importance, are in the Sovereign's hands, and wholly at his diſpoſal.* Now I ask the Authour, Whether the Government of *Limerick* be a Place of *Power, Truſt, and Importance?* If it be, then the Authour's Notion of a ſettlement (if it were true) will do him no ſervice, nor can he prove we ought to ſubmit. For as yet all Places of Power, Truſt, and Importance, are not in his hands, nor at his diſpoſal, and conſequently the Government is not *throughly ſettled*, according to the Authour's own account of ſuch a ſettlement; If it be ſaid that place is in *Ireland*, and *England* is a Kingdom entire of it's ſelf, then what becomes of the poor *Iriſh* men? I doubt they muſt be Rebels for all our Authour's Demonſtration; and then alſo, what can be ſaid to juſtifie a War there,

and

and excuſe the Army's fighting againſt a Prince who hath both right and Authority. If it be ſaid *Ireland* is a Branch of the Crown of *England*, annex'd to it, and dependent of it; then I ſay that the *Crown, with all it's Dignities, Authorities, Revenues*, &c. *are not perſonally enjoy'd*, and then according to our Authour the Government is not *ſetled*; and ſo he has made a fair *Demonſtration*. He demonſtrates, we ought to ſubmit, when the Government is ſetled, and then he Demonſtrates the Government is not ſetled, and ſo we ought not to ſubmit. Well; however let us for once ſuppoſe that the Crown and all it's Dignities, &c. (I ſuppoſe the Authour excepts a Right Title) are recognized and enjoy'd, What then? Why then, *with ſubmiſſion*, the Authour *cannot but conceive the Government is ſetled*. Now we muſt remember that the Author tells us, that, in his Book Obedience and Submiſſion to the preſent Governmt. is *demonſtrated* from the Convocation; and it is to be noted likewiſe, That this is all he offers us for *Demonſtration* out of that book, and is his *cannot but conceive to demonſtrate*. I hope the Authour does not think all his *Conceits Demonſtrations*, how ſtrongly ſoever he may be poſſeſs'd with them. Well, it muſt be own'd, how bold ſoever the Authour is in his Aſſertions, he is very modeſt in his Proofs: It is in the Title, high and lofty *Demonſtrate*, but in the Proof very humble and meek, he *can't but conceive*, and that alſo *with ſubmiſſion*.

But whatſoever the Authour may conceive, It is plain the Convocation does not conceive that the enjoyment of the *Crown with all it's Dignities*, &c. is that *thorough Settlement* to which is due Submiſſion and Obedience, as to God's Authority; as in the Caſe beforementioned of *Joaſh* and *Athaliah*. Athaliah *perſonally enjoy'd the Crown with all it's Dignities*, &c. *And all Places of Power, Truſt*, &c. *were in her hands, and at her diſpoſal*; and this alſo for no leſs a time than ſix years, and in as full and ample a manner, as any Uſurper, or any Rightfull King ever enjoy'd them: But for all that the Convocation is ſo far from urging obedience to her, as to God's Authority, that they expreſly juſtifie the Reſiſting, nay, the Slaying her. And this is a clear Demonſtration, that by a *thorough Settlement* the Convocation does not mean a full Poſſeſſion of Power merely: For they ſay that when a Government is *throughly ſetled*, it ought to be obeyed, as God's Authority, not only for Fear, but for Conſcience ſake. But they ſay alſo, that when *Athaliah* was fully poſſeſſed of the Throne, ſhe ought not to be obeyed, but to be reſiſted and ſlain. And the Concluſion from theſe Premiſſes is, that to be fully poſſeſſed of the Throne, is not of it ſelf to be ſo *thoroughly ſetled* as to make it God's Authority, and Obedience to become a Duty. So that whatever the Convocation may mean by *thorough ſetled*, it is plain they do not mean by it what our Authour does; and I think there is no difficulty at all, (if Men will look without prejudice,) in underſtanding what they do mean by it.

There are but two ways to underſtand the ſenſe of any Authour; the natural and uſual Conſtruction of the words they expreſs themſelves by, and if there be any obſcurity or doubt in the meaning of ſome Expreſſions, to interpret them by other Expreſſions and Aſſertions in the ſame Authour. Let us try theſe in the Controverſie before us.

I. The words in Controverſie are *Thoroughly ſetled*. And the Queſtion is, what is uſually underſtood by them?

I am pretty confident. That *bare Poſſeſſion*, let it be never ſo full as to the Extent, was never meant by them, with reſpect to *Civil Poſſeſſions*, (and that is the Caſe.) *Settlement* is a Term

very usual and Common in our Law, and moſt Men underſtand the ſenſe of it, and expreſs themſelves by it accordingly. It denotes theſe two things:

1. The Legality of a thing, it's being according to Law. *Settlement* and *Eſtabliſhment* are ſynonomous; an illegal Settlement is no Settlement; and nothing in a Government can be ſaid to be ſettled, but what ſtands upon the Foundation of Law. This is the *Baſis* of all Settlements in a Conſtitution, and without this 'tis a Caſtle in the Air, a Building without a Foundation, and ſuch a Settlement as never was heard of.

2. It denotes a quiet and peaceable Poſſeſſion, without Diſturbance from other Claims or Pretenders. A Man can never be ſaid to be *ſetled* in an Eſtate, who hath onely an *uſurped Poſſeſſion* of it, and when there are other and better Claims and Titles on foot againſt him, and by virtue of which he may be ejected the next Aſſiſes. And to ſay a Man is *ſettled* in the Poſſeſſion, when the right Owner is actually at Law with him for it, or declares that he will be ſo, ſo ſoon as he has opportunity or Money to manage the Suit, is very ſtrange, if any thing in this Age can be ſtrange.

If our Anceſtors ſhould riſe up amongſt us, and we ſhould expreſs our ſelves to them in the moſt obvious Terms of *Allegiance, Succeſſion, Settlement*; they would no more underſtand our meaning, than if we talked to them in the Language of the *Indies*. We have a Metaphyſical Allegiance, and to ſuit that we muſt now have a Philoſophical Settlement; as if a Man was ſettled in Civil Poſſeſſions juſt as he is ſettled in his Seat, or on Horſe-back: If he can but get his Feet in the Stirrups, and the Reins in his Hands, he is ſettled in the Saddle. But ſurely there is ſomewhat more to ſettle a Man in the Poſſeſſion of any Eſtate, and much more of the greateſt Civil Poſſeſſion. At this rate, if a Man can but get into the Manour-Houſe, and perſuade the Servants and Tenents to atturn to him, he is as firmly ſettled in the Poſſeſſion of it, as if he had purchaſed it with his Money, or it had deſcended to him by a thouſand Generations.——— But there is no end of Abſurdities.

There is one word more to be conſidered, and that is *throughly*, (*throughly ſetled.*) And the Convocation is very exact and preciſe, and have uſed that word both in the Chapter, and alſo repeated it in the Canon, laying a great ſtreſs upon it, and as if the whole determination of the buſineſs depended on it; and certainly they meant ſomething by it. Now what is the import of *throughly*, but perfectly, to all intents and purpoſes. The Latines expreſs it *omnino, omni ex parte*; a Government that is *altogether, upon all accounts ſetled.* Put theſe together, *Settlement* always reſpects Right, and a peaceable Poſſeſſion of that Right, without any better Claims or Pretenders; and a *thorough Settlement* is the utmoſt of that: and that is when ſuch a Right is enjoyed plainly, evidently, without any Contradiction or Objection.

This is the plain meaning of the Words, and therefore the plain meaning of the Convocation: But if there were any obſcurity in them, it will appear by conſulting the Context, and other places, that that was their meaning, and no other; and that is the other way of underſtanding the ſenſe of an Authour.

I have already conſider'd the Inſtance of *Athaliah*, which is as full and direct againſt the Authour as any thing can be, and can never be evaded, but by charging the Convocation with being as inconſiderate, and as full of Contradictions as himſelf: But for the farther

ther clearing this point there is one thing more to be obſerved from that Inſtance, and that is the Reaſon they give why *Athaliah* was a *Tyrannical Uſurper*, and upon what account they juſtifie the Proceedings of *Jehoiada* and the People againſt her; and that is, Joaſh, *their late King's Son, being then their oneiy natural Lord and Sovereign*, and which in the Canon they expreſs thus, *the Right Heir of that Kingdom being then alive*; plainly intimating, That if the Right Heir had not been alive, *Athaliah*, (by what ill means ſoever ſhe attained it,) having got Poſſeſſion of the Kingdom, would by that have had a Right to the Government: For a Poſſeſſory Right is ſomething, and where there is no better, that ought to carry it. And the Concluſion from hence is this: That any Perſon (by what means ſoever) gaining the Poſſeſſion of the Throne, if there be no better Claims againſt him, then he hath a Right to it; and then, and not till then, he is *throughly ſetled*. It is agreed on all hands, That a Right to a Government may be acquired; by the Death or Ceſſion of the Perſons in whom the Right was: And this is the Caſe.

In this Chapter the Convocation mentions ſeveral variations of Government, as to the Forms, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy; and as to the ambitious encroaching of Kings upon their Neighbours, and particularly the four Monarchies, and the King of *Babylon* upon the Jews: All which reſpective Governments, though they were begun by Rebellion, Ambition, and unlawfull means, (which the Convocation condemns,) yet afterwards they became lawfull Governments, and had *ſuch* a Right to the reſpective Governments they did poſſeſs. And I defie the Authour, or any Man elſe, to ſhew me one ſingle Inſtance (either in this Chapter, or any where in the whole Book,) of any Government, That the Convocation requires or juſtifies Allegiance to be paid to it, but what had firſt acquired ſuch a Right. And if they cannot, as I am pretty well aſſured they cannot, why do they make ſuch a Pother about two words, and diſingenuouſly placed, and unworthily interpret them, both contrary to their common and uſual meaning, and contrary to the whole Doctrine, and every Inſtance in the whole Book.

This was the Caſe of the *Babylonian*, *Perſian*, *Macedonian*, and *Roman* Governments over the Jews; but this was not the Caſe of *Athaliah* and *Antiochus Epiphanes*; and therefore the Convocation requires Submiſſion to *thoſe*, but juſtifies the Reſiſtence of *theſe*.

This Propoſition in the Convocation is univerſal, *That whatever Government is univerſally ſettled, ought to be obeyed*. And if it appears in all and every one of the Inſtances they give of Government, to which they ſay Obedience is due, that theſe Governments had ſuch a *Right*; and if it appears likewiſe, that in every one of theſe inſtances they give of Government, where there was not *ſuch* a Right, (though never ſo full Poſſeſſion of Power,) that they may be reſiſted: Then it plainly follows, that as by being *throughly ſetled*, they do not mean bare Poſſeſſion of Power, (though it be never ſo full,) ſo by it they do mean, and can mean nothing elſe than the Acquiſition of *ſuch* a Right. And this I take to be fair Reaſoning, for every Authour is the beſt Interpreter of his own ſenſe. And when the Convocation gives us a general Rule about Obedience to Government, what better way is there to underſtand their meaning, than to apply our ſelves to their particular Inſtances, (which in all Caſes explain and prove General Rules?) And if they give us Inſtances of ſome Governments, where was Poſſeſſion and no Right, and juſtifie the Reſiſtence of ſuch Governments, and if they give us In-

Inſtances of other Governments where was both Poſſeſſion and Right, and ſay they ought to be obeyed: It is plain the difference only lies between *Right* and no *Right*; and they mean where there is Poſſeſſion of Government and no Right, it is *not* thoroughly ſettled, and may be reſiſted; and where is Poſſeſſion and Right is thoroughly ſetled, and it ought to obeyed. And let thoſe great Gentlemen who talk ſo much of a *Plenary Poſſeſſion without Right* try if they can find any one Inſtance in the whole Convocation Book, that will run parallel with the Doctrines they teach, and the Interpretations they make. For my part I know but two, (*Athaliah* and *Antiochus*,) and both which the Convocation condemns; all the Reſt (and which the convocation approves) they had acquir'd a Right to their reſpective Governments. And it is an unaccountable Method of Interpretation to pick out two words from a Book, and put a ſenſe on them directly contrary to all Inſtances in that Book.

But that this and no other is their meaning of a Government being *thoroughly ſetled*, is farther evident from the Proof the Convocation brings of this Doctrine in this Chapter: For after that they had aſſerted that a Government (by what ill means ſoever attain'd) after it is *thoroughly ſettled* ought to be obey'd. For the Proof and Confirmation of this aſſertion they immediately mention the *Iſraelites* not rebelling againſt the Kings of *Egypt*, tho' oppreſſed, *&c.* and the Jews, when in ſubjection to the Kings of *Babylon*, are condemn'd by the Prophet *Jeremy* for rebelling againſt them by the inſtigation of falſe Prophets, *&c.* Now I ſuppoſe no man will deny but the Convocation produc'd thoſe as a full and direct Proof of their Affections (for they add no other,) and the connexion is this: A Government, tho' obtained by ill means, when throughly ſetled, is to be obeyed; for that the *Iſraelites* obey'd the Kings of *Egypt*, and the Jews in Captivity did the ſame to the Kings of *Babylon*. And then we have a clear account what they mean by a Government *thoroughly ſetled*; *i. e.* ſuch a Government as was the *Egyptian* over the *Iſraelites*, the *Babyloniun* over the Jews: And each of theſe had an undoubted Right to their reſpective Governments. Such a Right I mean as that we are now ſpeaking of by Death, Ceſſion, or Preſcription; and then it neceſſarily follows, that they mean a Goverment is then only *throughly ſetled* when ſuch a Right is acquir'd, otherwiſe theſe Inſtances, (which the Convocation brings to prove and illuſtrate it,) inſtead of confirming deſtroy's their main Aſſertion, and it would ſtand thus: In the Aſſertion it would be Poſſeſſion *without Right* is God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed; but in the Proof Poſſeſſion *with Right* is God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed.

The Summ of this Matter is this: There are ſeveral ways of attaining a Right to a Government, beſides Lineal Deſcent, as by the Death or Submiſſion of thoſe in whom the Right was joined, with the Conſent and Submiſſion of the People; and alſo a long undiſturbed Poſſeſſion, called Preſcription. Now all Mankind are agreed, That a Right to a Government by theſe ways, may be attained; and though the ways that are uſed to attain that Right, are always unjuſt, (as the Convocation ſays by Ambition, Rebellion, *&c.*) Yet when that Right is attained, theſe Governments reſpectively are then lawfull Governments, and ought to be obeyed. Upon this Foot moſt, if not all the Governments in the World do now ſtand, and the Convocation Book (as the Title expreſſes) concerns the Government of the Kingdoms of the whole World. And agreeably to that they were obliged to diſcourſe of all

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the Rights of Government, which they doe under two Heads or *Claſſes*. Such Rights of Government as are attained by juſt ways; and ſuch Rights as are attained by unjuſt ways: And having before ſpoken of thoſe Rights that are juſtly attained, as by God's expreſs Nomination and Lineal Deſcent, they now in this Chapter come to diſcourſe of thoſe Rights which are attained by unjuſt ways, as by Rebellion of Subjects, Ambition, and Greedineſs of Encroaching Kings. But leſt it ſhould be thought that wicked ways of attaining this Right was a prejudice to the Right it ſelf, and People from thence ſhould take occaſion to rebell, and diſturb all the Governours of the World, becauſe they could not ſhew an expreſs Order from God, or derive the Pedigree of their Government even from *Adam* or *Noah*; to prevent the terrible Confuſions that ſuch a Notion would make in the World, they ſay that the wicked ways of attaining it, or the Wickedneſs of the Perſons that have it, is no Impeachment of the Right it ſelf; but when it is attained, it is God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed, as the *Iſraelites* obeyed *Pharaoh*, and as the *Jews* obeyed *Nebuchadnezzar*.

This is the plain and obvious ſenſe of this Chapter, this the nature of the Thing, this their Method led them to, and this is agreeable to all the Inſtances they give us of Government, and this is ſuitable to all the Doctrines which they teach about it.

Now therefore I ſhall farther ſhew the Abſurdity of this Authour's Interpretation in the three following Particulars:

I. It is inconſiſtent with the main and fundamental Doctrine delivered in the Book.

II. It reproaches the Worthies of the Church of *England*, who ſuffered between the Years 42 and 60.

III. It maintains an abſurd, unreaſonable, and ungodly Doctrine.

1. Such an Interpretation is inconſiſtent with the main and fundamental Doctrines of the Convocation Book.

I have already ſhewed it is inconſiſtent with all the Inſtances they give, and I ſhall now ſhew that it is inconſiſtent with the fundamental Doctrines they teach.

The principal Doctrines of the Convocation Book are *Paſſive Obedience* and *Nonreſiſtence*, and the whole Deſign of it ſeems to be, (that I mean that concerns the Civil Government,) to make it good, That Subjects are bound to obey their lawful Governors, and upon no Account whatſoever to reſiſt them: This, I ſay, is their fundamental Doctrine, and whatever they deliver, it hath ſome way or other a reference to it; and therefore it is but neceſſary to interpret their Expreſſions in ſuch a ſenſe as may beſt ſuit with their main Deſign. And now let us try which Interpretation of a *Thorough Settlement* beſt agrees with *Paſſive Obedience*, and *That* we are in Juſtice bound to believe to be the ſenſe of the Convocation.

Now to ſay a Government is *thoroughly ſetled*, when it hath acquired a Right, by a long Tract of uninterrupted Poſſeſſion, or by the utter Deſtruction, or Submiſſion, of the Right Heirs; this does not in the leaſt interfere with the Doctrine of *Paſſive Obedience*, but is conſonant to it, and to every other Doctrine and Expreſſion in the whole Book. But for our Authour's Interpretation, when a Perſon hath got full Poſſeſſion of Power, and the Lawfull King

is alive, and to far from ſubmitting that he actualy conteſts his Right, and demands the Allegiance of his Subjects in order to it: In ſuch a Caſe, to ſay that they muſt quit their lawfull King, become ſubjects to the Poſſeſſor, transfer all their Allegiance and Duty to him, do all they can to eſtabliſh him in the Poſſeſſion, and as much to keep the other out, become irreconcileable and mortal Enemies to him, and if need be to fight againſt and kill him, (for all theſe neceſſarily follow from that Notion,) Now how the Anthor will *Demonſtrate* this to be Paſſive Obedience, or reconcile it to itſelf, is not for me to comprehend. The Author hath offered at as ſtrange things as that: For if any one of a Family, tho' never ſo many degrees off, and him ſet up by the People too, be Succeſſion in a Hereditary Monarchy. If forceable Poſſeſſion be a *through ſettlement*, then for any thing I know, fighting againſt and killing a Rightfull King, even when we acknowledge the Right to be in him, may be Paſſive Obedience. And if this be the Caſe, I have nothing to doe but to beg of God to keep me in my ſenſes.

And that is abundantly ſufficient to prevent impoſing on by ſuch Arguments, the Authour if he pleaſes may call white black; and heat cold, but if he do, ſure he expects not to convince others of it, nor eaſily perſwade them he believes it himſelf.

But then if fighting againſt and killing a King we have ſworn Allegiance to, be not Paſſive Obedience, then by a Government throughy ſettled the Convocation does not mean bare Poſſeſſion of Power.

2. This Interpretation reproaches thoſe worthies of the Church of *England*, who ſuffered between the Years 42 and 60,

A very few Years ſince it would have been thought a high Degree of Madneſs for a Church of *England* Man to have doubted, who (in the late Times) acted moſt agreeably to the Principles of that Church in the point of Allegiance and Government, either Archbiſhop *Juxton*, Biſhop *Cozens*, Biſhop *Gunning*, &c. or *Hugh Peters*, Dr. *Owen*, or *John Goodwyn*. But now our Authour hath clearly determined it for *Hugh*, and his Brethren, and againſt the Biſhops. Now as ridiculous as this is, it is certainly the Caſe; for if the Authour be right, all theſe Reverend and Excellent Men who were undone for their Loyalty, acted ignorantly or unſincerely; and thoſe onely who followed the ſeveral Revolutions, and adhered to them againſt the King, are the Men that ted according to the Principles of the Church of *England*; nay, even the *Regicides* themſelves will put in for Church of *England* Men too; and (which is the ſtrangeſt thing of all) even in point of Allegiance and Government. For that Government that appointed the High Court of Juſtice, had a full Poſſeſſion of Power, and *all Places of Truſt*, &c. *were in their Hands, and at their diſpoſal.* And by reaſon of that they had a ſufficient Authority, (even God's) by Commiſſion from which they acted; and then alſo their Allegiance was juſtly tranſferred from the King to them: By Virtue of which they did but their Duty, both in acting under ſuch a Commiſſion from their Governours, and alſo in purſuing to death the Enemies and Competitors of that Government whoſe Subjects they were, and whoſe Security and Eſtabliſhment they were bound to promote.

And is this no prejudice to this Interpretation? Muſt we part with our Senſes, as well as our Principles? Is it poſſible for any Man to believe

— that

that *John Goodwyn* was a better Church of *England* Man, in point of Allegiance and Government, than Doctor *Hammond*? Or that the Principles of the Church of *England* juſtifie the Murther of *Charles* the firſt? I do not know of what weight this may be with the Authour; but any Man, who had any reſpect for the Church of *England*, would have been a little cautious how he had faſtened ſuch a Senſe upon the Words of ſuch a Venerable Convocation, as ſhould juſtifie the moſt execrable Villany under the Sun, and reproach as great and worthy Men as ever were Members of it, and ſome of them probably Members of this Convocation, and condemn them in thoſe very Inſtances which were the higheſt Evidences of their Vertues and Sincerity, and upon Account of which their Names and Memories will always be precious; and one ſingle Example of ſuch Men is of more value with all good Men, than that of one thouſand Weather-Cock Divines, who can turn themſelves and their Principles as there is occaſion, and by the help of *Publick Good*, and a *Jeſuitical* Diſtinction or two, can make them ſuit with any Power in the World.

Now Men (if they have a Mind to it) may defend *Hugh Peters*, *Bradſhaw*, and the *High Court of Juſtice*, and condemn their Judges and Juries for murthering honeſt men, who did but their Duty. They may, if they will, applaud the Practices of *Nye*, *Marſhall*, and *Milton*, and diſlike thoſe of the Glorious Sufferers for their King and their Conciences. But to bring for Principles of the Church of *England* that will doe all this, is as ridiculous as it is ſhameleſs and Impudent.

3. This Interpretation maintains an abſurd, unreaſonable, ungodly Doctrine, and that is, *That the Permiſſion of Providence is a Rule of Practice, and a ſufficient Warrant to act contrary to the Rules of Right and Juſtice amongſt Men.* This does not onely naturally follow from this Interpretation, but the Authour aſſerts the ſame allmoſt in ſo many words: For going about to prove that the Revolution is God's doing, he tells us, (in Page 14, *&c.*) *That God's Providence in permitting, is a ſufficient Indication of his Will and Pleaſure, as to the Event. And* (ſaith he) *ſince Prophecy hath ceaſed, ſure I am, that nothing but Providence is vocal to us.* I wonder what the Authour thinks of Scripture, and Right, and Laws among Men; ſure theſe are as *vocal* as Providence, and we are bound to make them the Rule of our Practices, and are ſo directed by God himſelf: But we have no Direction or Warrant to act by any Methods of Providence, contrary to them. The Author goes on, *Such ſtrong Arguments may we produce from it, as will not with Eaſe or Ridicule be eluded.* But for all that I muſt tell our Authour, That his Opinion as it is fooliſh, ſo it deſerves to be laughed at; but as 'tis impious, to be execrated and abominated, as tending to the deſtruction of all Righteouſneſs, and even of Humane Society: For if men muſt direct their Lives not by fixed and ſtated Rules, but by God's Permiſſions and Providential Occurrences, we ſhould ſoon have a mad World on't, and Robbery, Rapine, Fraud, and Oppreſſion, would be more to be obſerved than (nay againſt) Right, and Law, and even Scripture it ſelf. But however the Authour is ſo fond of his Notion, That he tells us, *He can't reſtrain his Pen from the moving of this Query: Whether the Manifeſt Interpoſitions of a Gracious Providence, that tends to the promoting of God's Honour, and*

to the Eſtabliſhment of his Church, be not to us (now that Prophecy is ceaſ'd) a Juſtifiable Ground for any rational Man to act upon? i. e. againſt known Laws and the engagement of our Oaths (for otherwiſe it is not the Authors Purpoſe;) and then with great Confidence adds, *I think this will hardly be deny'd.* What doth the Authour mean? or where does he live? *Hardly be deny'd?* Why it has been deny'd a thouſand times over, and there is ſcarcely a ſermon that treats any thing of Providence, but denyes it; and I do deny it, and the Authour ſhall ſee what grounds I have have for it: But I obſerve from the Authour's Query,

1. That he takes too much upon him to determine the Interpoſition of Providence, as tending to God's Honor, *and Eſtabliſhment of his Church,* (in the ſenſe he would have it:) For the Authour may know, if he pleaſe, That God's Honor is as much, and generaly more promoted by the Patience and Sufferings of his People, than by their external Proſperity; eſpecially if that Poſperity be gain'd, or endeavor'd to be gain'd, by undue means: It is not for the Honour of God to carve for our ſelves, to take ſuch courſes to ſecure us as he does not allow of, and to ſet up his Providence in Contradiction to his Laws. And the Conſtancy and Fidelity of men, and eſpecially of the Clergy, to their Principles, tends more to the Honour of Religion, and more recommends it to the World, than to change and turn them to all Times and Seaſons; and the Church is better eſtabliſhed upon the Foundation of Truth and Juſtice, than upon any worldly Power; or when ſhe deſerts theſe, and makes a Rule of Divine Permiſſions. The Authour is very bold with Providence, and not onely makes the ſecret Things of God a Rule for common Behaviour, but determines them to what end he pleaſeth. There is no doubt but that God will be glorified in all his Proceedings; but whether by ſuch Interpoſitions of his Providence, he will bring Glory to himſelf, by the Patience and Fidelity of his Servants, or any other way, is more than the Authour can know, and he muſt be very aſſuming, if he undertakes to determine.

2. As to the Authour's main Query, Whether the Interpoſitions of Providence be not a juſtifiable Ground for a reaſonable Man to act upon, let him anſwer it himſelf in this other Query: Whether, if a poor Man hath ſtoln his Neighbor's Purſe, or (which is nearer to our Authour) if a Thief hath ſtollen it, and given it him, may he keep it, though he knows it is ſtollen, and from whom? He is poſſeſſed of it by Providence, he did not ſteal it himſelf, and it is very gratious to him to ſupply the needs of himſelf and his poor Family. In ſuch a Caſe I ask, may he honeſtly keep it? I ſuppoſe our Author will ſay No, and the Reaſon is becauſe he can't *lawfully* do it. So then it is not the interpoſition of Providence but the Lawfulneſs of the thing *that is the juſtifiable ground for a rational Man to act upon.*

But does not the Scripture and the Convocation Book, ſay that God is the Univerſal Monarch of the World, That he ſets up and pulls down Kings, altereth, beſtoweth, and transferreth Kingdoms?

Very true; and does not the ſame Scripture ſay That God is the Lord of all private Mens Eſtates, as well as of Kingdoms, and that he exalteth and depreſſeth, that he maketh Rich and Poor, and altereth their Stations and

and Conditions, as ſeems beſt to the Divine Wiſdom.

And is it not very foul to argue from hence? Therefore if any Man by the Permiſſion of Providence, can corruptly, fraudulently, or forcibly, get his Neighbour's Goods, or Eſtate into his Poſſeſſion; why, he muſt have them: The Laws and Judges, and all Men elſe, muſt doe what they can to keep him in Poſſeſſion; for it is God's Will it ſhould be ſo: For (ſaith our Authour, Page 14.) *God's Providence in permitting, is a ſufficient Indication of his Will and Pleaſure, as to the Event.* The Iſraelites, by God's expreſs Direction ſpoiled the *Ægyptians*; and therefore if any Man ſpoil his Neighbour, and get his Money or Jewels into his Hands, they are all his own: For our Authour is very *ſure, ſince Propheſie hath ceas'd, Providence is only vocal to us; and he can from thence produce ſuch ſtrong arguments as will not with eaſe be eluded.* And is not this pure Caſuiſtical Divinity, and admirably fitted to promote Righteouſneſs and Juſtice in the World? But if this hold not good in private Eſtates, I would fain have the Authour ſhew me a Reaſon why it does in Kingdoms? God hath the ſame Propriety, his Providence is the ſame, and the general Principles and Accounts of God's Proceedings in Scripture, are all one: And therefore if an Argument from Providence be not good, with reſpect to private Eſtates, neither is it with reſpect to Governments; and Right, and not Providence, muſt govern us in one Caſe, as well as the other.

The State of this Matter is plainly this: Where we are free, we may act upon the Interpoſitions of Providence, as we ſee occaſion; but where we are already bound up by Oaths and Laws, their Obligation will hold us againſt all Providences, (nakedly and barely conſidered,) and we cannot be diſcharged of them till God by his Providence hath ſo ordered and diſpoſed Matters, as we may lawfully act without the Breach and Violation of them. When a Government is altered, and ſo as to require a Right to the Subjects Allegiance, in the forementioned ways of Death, Ceſſion, *&c.*) It is certain this comes by Providence, (and therefore juſtly and fitly aſcribed to it:) But then the immediate Reaſon and Ground of Submiſſion is not the Permiſſion or Providence of God merely; but Providence proceeding ſo far, as to open a way that it may be done lawfully, and without prejudice to other Ties: In this ſenſe, we may follow the Direction of Providence, and become Subjects to a Government that *Providence* ſhall *ſo* ſet up. But this ſenſe will not ſerve our Authour's turn, and yet it is the ſame that he delivereth, though he he doth not know it. He tells us in page 15. That *without the Interpoſitions of Providence, Predictions themſelves are not raſhly to be executed*; *i. e.* till Providence hath ſo cleared the way, as to make it lawfull to put them in Execution.

A little before he quotes a Paſſage out of the Convocation-Book, *p.* 47. *That the Succeſs of Divine Benedictions* (which afterwards he calls *Predictions*, as if *Benedictions* and *Predictions* were all one,) *are to be left to the Diſpoſition of God's Heavenly Providence.*

Now this Paſſage in the Convocation refers to *Samuel's* annointing *David* King, intimation thereby, that *Samuel* did not depoſe *Saul*, nor put *David* upon undue Means to gain the Crown, but left the accompliſhment of it to God's Providence, to clear and open a way for him, that he might lawfully take it. And it is plain ſo *David* underſtood it; for though he

he was annointed King by God's expreſs Commandment, (and that is ſomewhat more than by Providence,) yet that did not tempt him to act againſt his known Duty: And though God put *Saul* twice into his power, he did not think *that Providence a juſtifiable Ground to act upon*, and to take that advantage to make himſelf King, (and yet I take it, that was a great deal more than *Permiſſion.*) And *David*'s Followers urge it home, *And the men of* David *ſaid unto him, behold the day which the Lord ſaid unto thee, behold! I will give thine enemy into thine hand, that thou mayeſt do to him as ſhall ſeem good unto thee.* 1. Sam. 4 4. And *Abiſhai* alſo ſaid to *David*, *God hath delivered thine Enemy into thy hand this day: now therefore let me ſmite him.* God had given his Enemy that purſued his Life into his hands, and here was a *gracious Providence to act upon*; God made him a Promiſe, and ſeemed to point out this as a means to accompliſh it; and it muſt be confeſſed this is as plauſible a Caſe as can be put. But *David* knew his Duty better, and though the text expreſſes, and *David* owns, that it was from God, and that God did it, and that is by an active and not barely permiſſive Providence; yet he knew that was no warrant for him to act againſt any branch of his Legal Duty, but ſays expreſly, *who can ſtretch forth his hand againſt the Lord's Annointed, and be guiltleſs?* It was againſt the Law to ſtretch forth his hand againſt the King, and no interpoſitions of Providence, would make that fact innocent, he followed Providence as far as he lawfully might, and the Laws of the Kingdom permitted, but he durſt not act upon it in contradiction to them; and therefore he ſays to *Abiſhai* that would have killed *Saul*, v. 10. *the Lord ſhall ſmite him, or his day ſhall come to die, or he ſhall deſcend into battel and periſh*; that is, he left it to God's Providence, ſo to order and diſpoſe of Things, and to bring it about in ſuch a manner, as he might take the Crown without the Violation of any Duty that he owed, or of any former Engagement he had made to King *Saul*. Now when Providence proceeds in this manner, and ſo to make a clear paſſage to Submiſſion, then, and then onely it is a juſtifiable Ground to act upon. But to talk of Divine Permiſſions, as a ſufficient Warrant to juſtifie our Acting againſt Common Right, and known Laws, and the ſtrongeſt Obligations, is certainly one of the wildeſt Aſſertions in the World.

1 Sam. 24. 3. & 26. 8. 9.

I ſhall end this with the plain Judgment of Doctor *Stillingfleet* in this matter: *The great Revolutions of Government are attributed to the particular Providence of God; God is the Judge, he pulleth down one and ſetteth up another; which doth not found any Right of Dominion, (which ſome fancyed, 'til the Argument from Providence was returned with greater force upon themſelves;) but it ſhews, that when God pleaſes to make uſe of Perſons or Nations, as the ſcourges in his Hand to puniſh a People with, He gives them Succeſs above their Hopes or Expectations; But that Succeſs gives them no Right.* Serm. before the Commons *Nov.* 13. 1671. 3d Edit.

For a Concluſion I ſhall add one Thing more, and which of itſelf alone is ſufficient to ſhew the Folly of our Authour's Interpretation, and that is, That (beſide the many Abſurdities and Contradictions that attend it,) it is contrary to the expreſs Doctrine and Declaration of the Members of that Convocation. Now I take it for granted, that they underſtood the Senſe of the *Convocation* a little

a little better than our Authour. I take it likewise for granted, That what they had determined for Doctrine in a publick and solemn Way, and in Convocation, they would neither contradict, nor yet deliver the clean contrary in their particular Writings. But then it will follow, that our Authour's Interpretation, and the Doctrine built on it is a new Invention, and never heard of in the Church of *England*, till very lately. Bishop *Andrews*, a very Eminent and Learned Member of that Convocation, in a Sermon preached before the King, but three Years after the ending of it, upon these Words, *Per me Reges regnant*, by me Kings reign, (*Prov.* 8. 15.) tells us, That the act *Regnant* is twofold; *Some are* Reges, *Kings; and yet reign not,* (*as* True Heirs *defeated,*) *and some reign, and are no Kings,* (*as do all* Usurpers *on the Throne*, per Fas Nefásque,) *allways one thing it is to be King, another to reign*; Joash *was true King all those six years he reign'd not*; Athaliah *reigned all those six years, yet true Queen she never was any Of such God saith,* Hos. 8. 9. Regnaverunt, sed non à me. *Why?* *For* per me Reges regnant, *by me Kings reign; Kings of lawfull and true Descent, they reign by me. These were none such, so they reigned without any* per, *from me; but when these meet, and they that be* Reges de Jure, regnant de Facto, *then it is as it should be, and* per me *it is that they so meet.*

On *Nov.* 5. 1613. p. 939. 2d Edit. 1631.

Bishop *Buckeridge*, Bishop of *Rochester*, (in his Book written in the Defence of *Barclay*, which Book was probably written some part of it in the time of this Convocation, for it is a very Elaborate Work, and was printed 1614.) layeth this down as a general Doctrine: *There is a great difference between a Tyrant reigning by a lawfull Title, and a Tyrant without Right and Title, and invading the Kingdom by force. If a lawfull King exercise Tyranny, he cannot be compelled by the Bishops, or Nobles, or People*, &c. *for such a Tyrant being in the Throne by a Just Title, is ordained of God, and he who resists him, resists the* Ordinance of God: *But if any Man snatcheth the Kingdom by Force and Tyranny, he is not a King, but an Enemy, and it is lawfull for any of the People to doe the same to him, as they may doe to an Enemy.* This is plain enough but yet there is more in that Chapter no less observable. *Bellarmine* had objected the *Quiet Possession* of *Athaliah* for six years. To which the Bishop answers, *How quiet soever it was, it was violent,* (*for she was guarded with Soldiers,*) *But what are six years to make a good Title of Prescription, and Possession, which, according to* Gregory Thologanus, *ought to be the Possession of an hundred Years more; and what are six Years to an hundred?* Athaliah *therefore had not acquired a Right to the Crown, neither by the Consent of the People, nor by the Prescription of Six Years, but being a meer Usurper, and no Queen, she might be deposed.* And so we have not only the sense of this Right Reverend Learned Prelate, that an Usurped Possession of the Crown cannot Claim our Allegiance, but also we have his sense of a *thorough settlement* (in one kind;) and that is when a Right to the Government is acquired by a Prescription, and that is a long and uninterrupted Possession joined with the

Dispar vero est ratio Tyranni legitimo jure regnantis, & Tyranno sine jure & titulo Regnum per Vim & Tyrannidem occupantis, &c. Rossin. *in rebus Temp. de Potestate Papæ, p.* 919.

At sex annos quiete regnavit & possessio ista est quieta, &c. p. 911.

the Conſent of the People. And ſo it follws a little after, when in anſwer to *Bellarmine's* Objecting other Governments, which in their beginnings were Violent and Tyrannical, but afterwards became lawfull, as that of the *Cæſars*, the *Goths*, and *Lombards*, he ſays, That *Governments acquired by the right of War, by Preſcription they uſually become lawfull.* But then by Preſcription it is plain he does not mean a quiet Poſſeſſion of ſix, nor many more Years, but when thereby a *Right* to the Government is acquired; and conſequently our Authour's full Poſſeſſion of Dignities, Prerogatives, &c. to to which our Allegiance is due, is a Notion that before now never ſaw Light among the true Sons of the Church of *England*.

Imperia jure Belli acquiſita, Temporis Præſcriptione legitima fieri ſolent. *Ibid.*

To theſe Right Reverend Prelates I crave leave to add a worthy and learn'd Authour, who alſo wrote many learned Tracts about theſe times, and he is Doctor *Jackſon*, who hath fully decared his own and the Church of *England's* Judgement in this very point. He puts theſe two Queſtions: *How far any man which without Title doth take upon him, and by fraud and violence gets opportunity to exerciſe Royal Authority over them may be reſiſted? The ſecond is: Whether He that by juſt Title is inveſted with Royal Power may be reſiſted in the Unjuſt and Tyrannical Exerciſes of it?*

P. 960. 3 T. laſt Edit.

To theſe two Queſtions the Anſwer hath been long ſince given, by ſome Moral Philoſophers, and approved of by beſt Divines.

1. He who is a mere Uſurper, or a Tyrant by Title, may be reſiſted by Violence, even to Depoſition, or Death, albeit he happens to exerciſe his Power with ſuch Moderation, as would become a Juſt and Lawfull King. He that is a King, or ſupreme Magiſtrate, by juſt and lawfull Title, may not be thus reſiſted, albeit he exerciſe his Power Tyrannically; touching the former it is a truth unqueſtionable, That a Tyrant by Title, or a mere Uſurper of ſupreme Power, or an Intruder into the Office Royal, may be reſiſted, without reſiſting the Ordinance of God, and the Reaſon is plain; for that he could never uſurp or continue his Power otherwiſe than by reſiſting ſome higher Powers, or by Wreſtling the Ordinance of God. And among others he Inſtances, *In caſe he uſurps or exerciſes Royal Authority over ſuch as have been formerly governed by Royal Succeſſion, he openly reſiſts Power much higher than his own, whether this Power be yet actually annexed to ſome known Perſons that have Right or Titles to the Kingdom by Succeſſion, or not.* 'Tis true, he ſays this reſiſtance may not be made by every body; but he ſays it likewiſe with this Qualification, *Save in the Right and Intereſt of the Right Heir, or by his Commiſſion and Command.*

And the ſame he ſays a little after, (*Page 968.*) when he anſwers to the Example of *Jehoiada's* depoſing of *Athaliah*, urged by the Papiſts for the Power of the Pope to depoſe Kings. *The Power royal or ſupreme was by Right annexed to the Infant Prince, as being next Heir; and* Jehoiada *depoſed her who by Force and Violence had uſurped the royal Scepter. Is it then all one in theſe Mens Divinity, for a Subject or Peer of any Realm to ſtand for the Right of his Liege Lord; and for the ancient Liberties of his Native Country againſt a Stranger, or Uſurper? And for a Stranger no Native member of this or the like Chriſtian Commonweal, to throw down the Lawfull King from his Throne?*

Throne? or to authorise his Subjects or others to do to him as Jehoiada *did to* Athaliah? *And to bring in a Stranger or Alien, as he to cast out a Stranger or Usurper.*

These Testimonies are clear enough, of the Doctrine that was own'd by the Convocation, and by that Age, and I could add many more, particularly of Bishop *Merton*, who not onely taught but practised this Doctrine, being himself a Sufferer under the Revolution begun in 42. and if Doctor *Field*, then Dean of *Worcester*, and many others, who have said the same; but this would be to write a New *History of Passive Obedience*: And I think I may challenge our Authour or any Man else, to shew me one single Instance, not onely of any Member of that Convocation, but of any approved Authour of the Church of *England*, and of that, or any other Age, but (either discoursing *ex professo* of Usurpation, or *in transitu* speaking of it,) what hath delivered always the very same Doctrine.

The Authour (in ridiculous Cant) tells us in Page 1, 2. *Since Bishop* Overall's *Convocation Book we plead Reason and Authority.* But I tell him in his own Language, That we have not onely got a whole Convocation of unprejudiced and learned Men, but the same unprejudiced and learned Men out of Convocation, and all the learned Men of that Age, and of all others of the Church of *England*, who were removed from any Temptations, and the fitteſt and most fair Judges to determine, that have unanimously and expressly condemned the Notions and Assertions of our Authour, and of all that hold the same.

I conclude with one Requeſt to our Authour, That when the next fit of Demonstrations takes him, he will be pleased to demonstrate this same thing from the *History of Passive Obedience*; and to encourage him, I can assure him, That Obedience and Submission, *&c.* will be as easily demonstrated from the *History of Passive Obedience*, as from *Bishop* Overall's *Convocation-Book*.

FINIS.

Poſtſcript.

SInce the finiſhing of this, Doctor *Sherlock* hath publiſh'd the Reaſons that induced him to take the Oath; He proceeds upon the ſame Grounds with this Author, and what is here ſaid (as to the main) is equally of Force againſt both, and will ſerve to Vindicate the *Convocation*-Book, as well from the Falſe Interpretation of the Dr. as of the Author. I ſhall not now ſtand (nor does it concern my preſent Purpoſe) to Examine all the Arguments the Dr. makes uſe of, (but that will be done in due time): But I ſhall fully further Conſider what he urges from the Convocation, and is not mentioned by the Author, and ſhall alſo Clear theſe Aſſertions deliver'd in the Anſwer, from ſuch things as may be rais'd in Objection to them, from the Dr's Book. And in Examining theſe, I ſhall have Occaſion to Conſider, and ſhall thereby ſhew the Weakneſs of the Fundamental Principles that he proceeds upon. I Obſerve then:

1. That the Interpretation of the Words of the Convocation in both, is the very ſame: But there is ſome Difference as to the manner of propoſing it. The Author is doubtful and modeſt; *He cannot but conceive, and with Submiſſion*, That a Government is ſettled, *when the whole Adminiſtration of Affairs, and all Places of Truſt*, &c. *are in the Hands of the Prince.* But the Dr. is very confident of it, it is *Pag. 9.* as plain, *as every body can ſee it*; and (ſaith he) *If this be not a ſettled Government, I deſpair of ever knowing what it is.* Now it muſt be remembred, that the Dr. owns, that in this Book he hath renounc'd one of his Principles, and the whole Book is an Evidence, and an Acknowledgment, that he hath been very much miſtaken, and hath continued a great while under the Power of thoſe Miſtakes. And ſo ſoon, and in the ſame Book to be again ſo full of Aſſurance, and to challenge People to Anſwer him? The Principle that he now renounceth, yea, and all the Principles he now diſputes againſt, (though he calls it ſoftly *Declaring his own Thoughts*) yet he did aſſert with as much Peremptorineſs as any thing in this New Book: And why ſhould he then deſpair of knowing any other Notion of a ſettled Government, beſides his own; perhaps, (if no body could inform him) the Dr. hereafter might himſelf find out another Notion of it; for what hath been, may be: In the mean time, there is another Notion of it deliver'd above, and which is more agreeable to the Rules of Truth and Juſtice, and to the common Acceptation of theſe Words among Men. And let the Dr. ſhew me any one Approved *Lawyer*, or *Civilian*, (who are ſuppos'd, to ſpeak the moſt properly in ſuch Matters) or any *Hiſtorian* that ever deliver'd ſuch a Senſe of thoſe Words, or that ever affirm'd, or in a meer Narratory way, declar'd, That an uſurped Poſſeſſion, was a *Thorough Settlement*, *Preface.* *Preface.* *Arg.*

tlement, or any Settlement at all, when there was a Rightful and Legal Title in being againſt it, and that Title actually conteſting. Let him ſhew me (in the particular Inſtance) any approved Author, that ever ſaid, That *Tyrannus ſine Titulo*, (as is the Caſe the Dr. puts in his Book) was a Government throughly ſettled, or any True Government at all. The Dr. expreſ-
Pag. 26. ly aſſerts, *That the Providence of God alters no Legal Rights, nor forbids thoſe who are diſpoſſeſſed of them, to Recover their Right when they can*; which (by the way) is ſtrange Doctrine: For why does not God's Authority in the Poſſeſſor, (if he have it) bind the Diſpoſſeſſed King as well as the People? and it is ſomewhat ſtrange that when God diveſts a King of his Government, he has ſtill a Right to it, and may juſtly recover it: This tends mightily to the Peace of Societies, (one of the Drs. Arguments.) The Caſe of the Kings the Convocation ſpeaks of as diſpoſſeſſed by God was quite otherwiſe, they had no Right left, as when *Jehu*
Convoca. was Anointed, *Foram* became his Sub-
Pag. 46. ject. But it muſt be conſeſſed thoſe Wiſe Men never thought of the Drs. Hypotheſis and new Notions: But to the purpoſe, the diſpoſſeſſed King according to the Dr. hath ſtill a Legal Right, and by vertue of which he may recover his Throne. Then I ſay, ſo long as the Caſe is ſo, and the Pretentions to Right ſtill in diſpute, the contrary Government can never be ſaid to be throughly ſetled; when there is a proſecution, but of a pretended Right, it cannot fairly be ſaid, that ſuch a Poſſeſſion is *throughly* ſetled, but when there is a plain, viſible, and indiſputable Legal Right againſt a Poſſeſſor, and that Right actually proſecuted, in ſuch a caſe to call bare Poſſeſſion, a *thorough ſettlement*, is one of the ſtrangeſt things in the World; and if that be a ſettlement, all the World have hitherto been miſtaken about it, and we are beholding to the Dr. for his new Diſcovery of a Settlement. As for his new Doctrine about Providence,

2. The Doctor ſays, That the Con- *pag.* 6.
vocation ſpeaks of the Subjection of the *Iſraelites* to the *Moabites* and *Aramites*, and to the Kings of *Ægypt* and *Babylon*, as their duty, and that they were bound to it, and from thence concludes the ſence of the Convocation to be, That Princes, who have no Legal Right may have Gods Authority, and ought to be obey'd. For ſaith he, the Government of *Iſrael*, and the *Ægyptian*, and *Babyloniſh* Kings never had any Legal Right: Now but Three Pages off, the Dr. tells us, *That the Sub-* *pag.* 9.
miſſion of the Prince may be thought neceſſary to transfer a Legal Right; and then all theſe Governments had a Legal Right to the Government of *Iſrael*: As to *Babylon*, the Dr. tells us, there was Gods expreſs Command for their Submiſſion, and *Nebuchadnezzar* carryed the Princes Captive with him, and I think there is no great doubt of their Submiſſion, and eſpecially if they were ſenſible that God Commanded it. As *pag*
to *Ægypt*, what Government the *Jews* had then among them does not appear, but what ever Government they had: Or, whoever they had for their Governours, it is plain they Submitted to the Kings of *Ægypt* as well as all the People; And the Convocation expreſ-
ly affirms they did ſo. And the Caſe *pag.* 58.
is the ſame with reſpect to the *Moabites* and *Aramites*; whatever Governours *pag* 51.
they had, they and the people Submitted; and the Convocation is as expreſs as can be; *They knew it was not Lawful to take Arms againſt the Kings whoſe* Subjects *they were*. What! *Subjects* without Submiſſion! and this the Dr. quotes too out of them; but then I wonder upon what grounds he ſaid they could have no Legal Right to Govern *Iſrael*; for if the Submiſſion of the Prince can Transfer a Legal Right, then they had a Legal Right, and then

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to be ſure they could have what they Actually had. If it be ſaid that God was at that time their Soveraign, and He did not Submit; it is true He did not, but the Text ſays Expreſly, that God deliver'd them into their hands. But then this would be an Argument againſt their Submiſſion; For the Dr. tells us, that where God entayles the Crown, the People were not to Submit to any Uſurper, if the Right Heir was alive; and therefore much more where God himſelf was their King, and then ſure they might Lawfully reſiſt theſe Kings, whoſe Subjects they were not, nor could be, and they needed no eſpecial Commiſſion or Direction, to deſtroy the Uſurpers as *Abud* did *Æglon*, but they might, Nay, they were bound to do it, as *Jehoiada* ſlew *Athaliah*. For I hope God's Entayl is not of greater force than his own immediate Government; ſo that either their Submiſſion Transferr'd a Legal Right, or elſe their Submiſſion was a ſin.

pag. 5. The Dr. aſſerts, That the Convocation ſpeaks of *Illegal* and *Uſurped* Powers; But the Dr's Proofs from them are only of *Legal* Powers. And Conſequently, that only Legal Powers have Gods Authority, and a Government is then throughly ſetled, when it becomes Legal. The Dr. will not, but the Convocation diſtinguiſhes between the means of acquiring a Power, and the Power it ſelf; the means of acquiring Power may be very unjuſt and *Illegal*, and yet the Power afterwards may be very *Legal*. But the Dr. is reſolv'd they muſt be all one, and becauſe the Convocation ſpeaks of the Ambition of Enchroaching Kings, and the Rebellion of Subjects, as a means whereby Governments have been alter'd, therefore by a Government being *thorough ſetled*, they muſt needs mean Uſurped Powers. As if it was impoſſible, for ſuch beginnings afterwards to acquire a Right, and ſo Terminate in a Legal Title, and 'Till that is, the Government is as unjuſt as the Rebellion and Encroachment: And a man cannot juſtly become a party to the Government, no more than to the Rebellion, for they are both equally unjuſt. except the Dr. thinks that ſtealing a purſe is very unjuſt, but the keeping it after it is ſtolen, is very juſt. I will grant the Dr, that a Government, by what ill means ſoever attain'd, may have God's Authority, and be thoroughly ſetled; But then I ſay, it has not Gods Authority, nor is thoroughly ſetled, till it ſtands upon the foundation of *Right*, and becomes *Legal*. The Convocation never mentions Uſurpation, or, Uſurper, name or thing, but in one place, and that is the Caſe of *Athaliah*, and they plainly condemne it, and juſtifie the killing her; But in the other inſtances of Government in that Book, a Legality is imply'd; Or in expreſs Terms affirm'd, *chap.* 31. it is ſaid when *Alexander* was dead, the *Jews* were free, *none of his* pag. 66. *Captaines having any* Lawful *intereſt, or Title to* Judah; plainly intimating that *Alexander* himſelf, and the *Perſian* before him, had a Lawful intereſt, and Title; and they likewiſe tell us of the *Romans*, that they were the *Lawful* pag. 82. Magiſtrates of the *Jews*. But nothing will ſerve the Dr's turn, but the Power muſt be as unjuſt as the means; and if it was granted him I wonder, what he would make of it. That would certainly be a very odd reaſon for Subjection, he that partakes with injuſtice, (as he certainly does that joyns with it) partakes with the guilt too. And if the Power be unjuſt, then to abet, to defend, ſupport and maintain that Power muſt be unjuſt likewiſe. The Dr's ſhift of Legal Rights, and Gods Rights will ſtand him in no ſtead, for that will ſerve all Caſes as well as his; God hath a Right to take away any mans life, or eſtate, as well as a Throne. But if this be done by Illegal ways, it is not God's Right and So-

Soveraignty that hinders, but we are bound to purſue the Wicked Inſtruments, and to bring them to Puniſhment; and whoever adheres to them is a Theif and a Murderer equal to them. And if we forſake the Laws and the plain Rules of Practice, and apply our ſelves to Providences and God's Rights of Creation, we muſt be forc'd to quit Truth and Juſtice, and adhere to a company of Theeves, Lyars and Murderers.

3. To the Caſe of *Joaſh* and *Athaliah*, the Dr. gives two Anſwers.

Pag. 34. 1. The firſt is this: *All that this Story amounts to is no more than this, That when a Legal and Rightful Heir is actually Poſſeſſed of the Throne, the Subjects may return to their Allegiance, and by his Authority proſecute the Uſurper*, &c. I anſwer, The ſtory amounts to a great deal more; and that is, That Subjects may ſet the Rightful Heir upon the Throne, altho' it be in the Actual Poſſeſſion of an Uſurper; for ſo *Jeboiada*, and the People did: They ſet up the Right Heir, and ejected the Uſurper, tho' ſhe had been in the Poſſeſſion of the Throne for ſix Years. But (ſaith the Dr.) *The Rightful Heir was actually poſſeſſed of the Throne, for* Joaſh *was firſt Anointed and Proclaimed, before any one ſtirred a finger againſt* Athaliah. But is the Dr. ſure, that *Joaſh* was actually Poſſeſſed of the Throne? He was Anointed indeed: But is Anointing actual Poſſeſſion? and it will not be eaſie to prove it according to the Drs. Notion of Poſſeſſion, of having the whole Adminiſtration of Affairs, and all the Authority of the Kingdom in his hands, for ſure *Athaliah* had ſome: But however, who Anointed? And who Proclaimed him? And who put him in Poſſeſſion? Why truly no body elſe but his own Subjects, and theſe very Men that had lived ſix Years under the Uſurper. And then I perceive that Subjects may ſtand by the Rightful Heir againſt an Uſurper, tho' Poſſeſſed of the Throne for ſome Years. But then, Where is that Fidelity, Allegiance and Obedience, that the Dr. ſays we are bound to pay to Uſurped Powers? But for all that, the Dr. goes on and ſays, *Now this is a very different Caſe from raiſing Rebellion againſt a Prince; who is in the Poſſeſſion of the Throne, to reſtore an ejected one.* And I pray where is this difference? A Man muſt open his Eyes wide, that can ſee it; Was not *Athaliah* in the Poſſeſſion of the Throne when *Jeboiada* Anointed *Joaſh*? The Dr. may call this *Rebellion* if he pleaſe, and *Athaliah* called it *Treaſon*, and perhaps upon the Drs. Principles: But for all that *Jeboiada* and the People did their duty to their Rightful Prince, and ſlew her that was in Poſſeſſion of the Throne. And that I ſuppoſe is no great ſign that they thought Poſſeſſion of the Throne by Providence was God's Authority, or that Allegiance was due upon that account. I know there is a difference between Anointing a New King, and Reſtoring an Ejected one. But the Queſtion is concerning Allegiance to an Uſurper in the Poſſeſſion of the Throne, and as to that there is no difference. For theſe pay as little Allegiance to an Uſurper who Anoint a King, and then Depoſe him, as thoſe who do it to reſtore an Ejected one: And I would fain know what difference there is (as to Allegiance to an Uſurper) between Anointing a New King, and upon his Authority diſpoſſeſſing an Uſurper, and doing the ſame thing upon the Authority of one already Anointed.

2. His other Anſwer is, *That God himſelf had intail'd the Kingdom of* Judah *on the Poſterity of* David, *and therefore nothing could juſtifie their Submiſſion to an Uſurper when the Kings Son was found; but in other Kingdoms where Entails are made by Providence, there the placing a Prince in the Throne,*

is

is a Reaſon to ſubmit to him as Gods Ordinance and Miniſter.

To this I Anſwer:

1. This Diſtinction is not in the *Convocation Book*, and ſo it does not affect their Sence: They do not ſpeak with reference to it, when they call *Athaliah* an Uſurper, and juſtifie the Proceedings of *Jehoiada* and the People againſt her; but the Reaſon they give is General, *The Right Heir of the Kingdom being alive*, which extends to all Kingdoms that are entayl'd, and go by Succeſſion: And it is plain they thought of no ſuch difference as to this matter; but that a thorough Settlement of a Government (and tho' attained by the ſame ill means) was the ſame thing, and had God's Authority in *Judah* as well as any other Nation, as in the Inſtances of the *Babylonians*, *Macedonians* and *Romans*, whoſe Government over the *Jewes* was not attained by honeſter means then *Athaliah's*, and was as much contrary to the entail upon *David's* Houſe, as hers; and yet they juſtifie and require Obedience to them, but juſtifie the ſlaying of her: And therefore it is plain, that by a *thorough Settlement* they do not mean a full Poſſeſſion of Power, for *Athaliah* had as full a Poſſeſſion of Power in the Kingdom of *Judah*, as had the *Babylonians*, *Macedonians*, or *Romans*, nor do they reckon God's entaile upon *David's* Poſterity any ground of difference in this matter, for the Government of *Judah* by *Babylonians* was as much contrary to that entail, as the Government of *Athaliah*.

2. The Drs. Arguments will equally juſtifie Submiſſion to *Athaliah* in the Kingdom of *Judah*, notwithſtanding ſuch entail, as to an Uſurper in any other Nation. I ſhall inſtance in two; his Argument from Providence, and his Argument from the neceſſity of Government for the Preſervation of Humane *Society*.

1. His Arguments from Providence: Theſe equally fit *Athaliah*, and ſhe had the ſame Pretenſions to Providence as any other Uſurper hath or can have: The Dr. tells us expreſly, *That it makes no difference in this Caſe to diſtinguiſh between what God permits, and what he does; for this diſtinction, does not relate to the events of things, but to the Wickedneſs of Men, which God only permits; but the events of all things are in his hands, and are ordered and diſpoſed by his Will and Counſil, as they muſt be, if God Governs the World.* Now according to this Doctrine, *Athaliah's* Uſurpation was the Act of God, and as much ſo, as any other Uſurpation: *Her wicked Councils and Deſigns* God only permitted, as he does thoſe of other Uſurpers; but her actual Poſſeſſion of the Throne was what God appointed, and was as much ordered and diſpoſed by his *Decree* and *Council*, as that of any Uſurper in the whole World. Farther, the Dr. ſays, *If there were ſuch a Diſtinction, we ought in reaſon to aſcribe the Advancement of Kings to Gods Decree and Council, becauſe it is the Principal Act of Providence which has ſo great an influence on the Government of the World; and if he Decree and Order any events, certainly he peculiarly Orders ſuch events as will do moſt good, or moſt hurt to the World.* And this fits *Athaliah's* Caſe as well as any other; and it ſeems her Advancement to the Throne was not only Gods Decree, but his *Peculiar* Decree and Order; for that event as well as any other Uſurpation, had a great influence, and might do much good or hurt in the World. Farther yet according to this Doctrine, the Dr. ſays, That *ALL Kings* (and then ſure *Athaliah* among the reſt) *are equally Rightful with reſpect to God, for thoſe are all Rightful Kings, whom we placed in the Throne by God.* (as *Athaliah* was) *and it is impoſſible there ſhould be a wrong King, unleſs a Man could make himſelf* pag. 12. Pag. 14.

ſelf King whether God will or no. Now I only ſuppoſe, that *Athaliah* could not do what is *Impoſſible*, nor (if ſhe had never ſo much minde to it) could ſhe make make her ſelf Queen *whe-God would or no.* The Dr. further adds, *He is our King who is ſetled in the Throne in the actual Adminiſtration of Soveraign Power, for King is the Name of Power and Authority, not of meer Right.* Now *Athaliah* had the actual Adminiſtration of Soveraign Power, and therefore according to the Dr. ſhe was Queen by Gods Authority, tho' not by the Law of the Land, and Allegiance muſt be due to her as well as to any other. And all the Drs. Arguments are as concluſive and valid for Submiſſion to *Athaliah*, as for Submiſſion to any body elſe: But if theſe Reaſonings be naught with Reſpect to her, ſo are they alſo with reſpect to any other Uſurpation; for if theſe be not certain Signs of God's Decree and Council, That a Perſon ſo poſſeſſed of the Throne, ſhould be own'd as King, and ſubmitted to, then they are no Rule for us; if they are, then they were a Rule for the *Jews*, and 'tis meer trifling to talk of God's entailing the Crown, as if God was ty'd any more to the entails of his own making, than he is to Humane entails, and his own Decrees and Orders would not cut off his own entails, as well as thoſe of men. If the Poſſeſſion of the Throne by Providence be a cleer and Demonſtrative Evidence, that ſuch a Perſon hath Gods Authority, and that God would have him obey'd as King, then it's ſo notwithſtanding any entail made by himſelf: But then, if it be not ſuch a demonſtrative Evidence, not only the Drs. Diſtinction is uſeleſs to his purpoſe, but all his Arguments are unconcluſive and ſignifie nothing.

2. His Argument drawn from the
Pag. 38. neceſſity of Government to the preſervation of Humane Society; now I ſuppoſe the Dr will grant me, that the People of *Judah* were a Humane Scociety, and then there is not one Argument the Dr. uſes but what will equally conclude for ſubmiſſion to *Athaliah* as to any other Uſurper, and the Dr. here argues from the nature of the thing, which is equally the ſame in all Governments. Now the Dr. tells us, That *Humane Societies muſt not diſſolve into a Mobbile, or Mr.* Hob's *ſtate of Nature, becauſe the Legal Prince has loſt his Throne, and can no longer Govern. For the end of Civil Government, is the ſafety and tranquillity of Humane Societies, and whatſoever is neceſſary and uſeful to this end, becomes a duty.* Now the ſafety of the *Jewiſh* Society was as much the end of that Government as of any other, and if for the preſervation of Humane Society, it be neceſſary to ſubmit to an Uuſurper, it was likewiſe neceſſary for the People of *Judah* to ſubmit to *Athaliah*, but if it was not neceſſary for their preſervation, or if that neceſſity would not juſtifie their Submiſſion to an Uſurper in that Kingdom, then it is plain that ſuch a Submiſſion cannot be warranted from the ends of Government, let theſe ends be what they will. It is not to be doubted but men may doe ſome things for the preſervation of a Society while they are under an Uſurper; but that will not ſerve the Drs. turn, except they go through with the matter, and do every thing that is due to a Rightful King. Biſhop *Sanderſon* owns it lawful to pay ſome kind of ſubmiſſion, as to defend the Country againſt a Forreign Enemy, to preſerve Trade and Commerce, *&c.* But without any regard to the Authority of the Uſurper or his Laws; for he has no Authority, and his Laws do not oblige in Conſcience, *&c.* Now the Dr. tells us, *He cannot be of his mind, for if the ſafety and tranquillity of* *Pag.* 39. *Humane Societies requires any thing of us, it both requires and juſtifies a great deal*

deal more: Well, whatſoever it requires, I hope it required as much in the Kingdom of *Judah* as any where elſe. And by that we ſhall eaſily diſcern the force of the Dr's Argument.

1. He ſays, *As the Biſhop ſtates the matter, this deſtroys Civil Government, and a governed ſociety, for here is neither King nor Subject, no Authority to Command, nor duty to obey, and no man will call this a Civil Government, or ſociety to which Authority, and Obedience is Eſſential.* Well now, I ask the Dr. what muſt the Subjects of *Judah* do, *Athaliah* had got the Poſſeſſion of the Throne for ſix years, and what would become of Society all that while? why 'tis plain as can be, they muſt own her Authority, and pay Allegiance to her: For ſays the Dr. *If Humane Societys muſt be preſerv'd, then the neceſſitys of government given Authority to the Prince, and lay an Obligation of Duty on the Subject: if God will preſerve humane ſocietys, we muſt conclude, that when he removes one King out of the Throne, he gives his Authority to him, whom he places there; for without Authority, Humane Societys muſt diſband.* This methinks is very bold, as if God had no other way of preſerving Humane Society, but according to our fancies, and Scheme of *Politicks*, but however it concludes ſufficiently againſt the Dr. for if Humane Society cannot be preſerv'd, but by the Authority of an Uſurper, and if God will preſerve Humane Society, it muſt be concluded that he hath given his Authority to him that Poſſeſſes the Throne, then he had given his Authority to *Athaliah*, or elſe all theſe dreadful conſequences muſt follow, and the Society of *Judah* muſt disband, and come to nothing. But then if it did not neceſſarily follow, that ſuch ſtrange things muſt come to paſs in the ſix years of *Athaliahs* Uſurpation; or however that that was not a ſufficient Reaſon for Transfering their Allegiauce to her, then 'tis plain that the Dr's. Argument, from the Nature of the thing is not true, Nor does he conclude rightly from it. And the Caſe is the ſame in what follows.

2. *I would aſk* (ſays he) *whether the Care of my own preſervation, and publick duty, &c. do oblige me in Conſcience to obey, and ſubmit to the Government, and the Prince, who governs, and to wiſh, and pray for, and do my utmoſt to endeavor their proſperity*; if it does, this is the ſame with Allegiance, and then *we may ſwear it too*; *if not, then I am at liberty to diſturb the Government*; *and how* (ſays the Dr.) *does this contribute to the ſafety, and Tranquility of Humane Societies?* That queſtion it does not concern me to anſwer; But this I ſay, that if it proves that we are bound in conſcience, for the ſafety of ſocieties, to pray for, and to endeavour the proſperity of an Uſurped Government; it proves alſo that the people of *Judah*, were oblig'd in Conſcience to do the ſame for *Athaliah*; and if it does not prove that, then it does not prove, that the Tranquillity of Humane Society is a ſufficient Reaſon to Oblige men in Conſcience, to Submit to, to pray for, and to Endeavour the Proſperity of an Uſurper.

3. *Suppoſe the Government ſhould not think it ſelf ſafe, to leave all men at liberty to diſturb it, but ſhould require an Oath of Fidelity, which is the Univerſal Practiſe of all Governments*, what ſhould the Subjects of *Judah* do in this Caſe? Why truly there is no remedy, they muſt e'en ſwear, for the Dr. tells us, *Should every Man refuſe the Oath, and the Prince had Power enough to compel, what muſt be the effect of this, but the utter Ruine, and deſtruction of the Nation.* But then if all this, and ten times more would not prove, that the People of *Judah* might Lawfully ſwear Allegiance to *Athaliah*, then it will prove that the Dr. is miſtaken in his Argument, and nothing can be concluded from it. I ſhall paſs over his next

reaſon,

Reason, which notwithstanding is equally applicable to the same purpose, and come to his

5. Which is concerning the presumed consent of the ejected Prince. Now (says the Dr.) *If we will presume, we should presume all that is reasonable*, i. e. *all that is necessary for the preservation of his Subjects, when he can Govern them no longer, and then we may presume his consent to Oaths of Allegiance*; all this I hope may be presum'd as well in *Judah*, as any other Country. But now the Dr. comes to Clench the Business, pag. 42. *and tho he will not meddle with that Question, whether a King leaving his Kingdoms in a fright be Abdication*; yet this (saith he) *one may reasonably presume, that a King who forsakes his Kingdom to consult his own safety, will give his Subjects leave to Consult theirs*; *if this will justifie a King to save himself by leaving his Kingdom, why will it not justifie Subjects, when their King has left them, to submit and comply with the prevailing Powers, as far as is necessary to preserve themselves? That is, even by Oaths of Allegiance, if that be necessary.* Now let us Transfer this to the Kingdom of *Judah*, *Athal ah* had kill'd as many of the Kings children as she could find to make way for her self, and *Joash* was taken away to save his life. And therefore the People of *Judah* might Consult their safety, and to save their places, and preferments, might become her Subjects, and pay her the same Allegiance as was due to the most Lawful Prince in the World, and swear an Oath of Fidelity to her to defend her against all men, even against him, whom they own'd, and acknowledg'd had the Right to the Throne. For (saith the Dr.) *Self-preservation is as much a Law to Subjects as to the Prince.* But then, if it does not prove that, then the Bishop is in the Right, and the Dr. in the wrong. And whatever else we may do to preserve the Societys, and our selves, We may not swear Allegiance, nor own the Authority of an Usurper.

And now are not these pure Arguments? The instance the Dr. pretends to answer, sets them in a clear light, and discovers the fallacy of them better than any trains of discourse. The Dr. knows, that an Argument that proves too much, is as faulty as one that proves too little: Every body sees that they prove nothing in that case that has respect to them, and therefore they prove nothing in ours, and with respect to us; for there is not one Argument (if it have any force) but what equally concludes for their submission to an Usurper, as for us; for the ends of Government are the same in all Countrys, and self-Preservation, and Preservation of Society, and the necessity of Government in order to it. All these are the same with respect to *Judah* as to any other Society, for I hope Gods entail did not make the preservation of the Society to be a less duty in them than in others. If it be said the Providence of God will take care in such extraordinary cases, I say so too; but then this is Universal likewise, and the Dr. who hath talked so much of Providence, might have let us have some of it here, where 'tis seasonable and proper, and the Application true; in all such streights and difficulties, we must refer our selves to Gods Providence, to find out a way for the safety of our selves and the Society, and not make a way for our selves, and act unwarrantably; and I am certain we have more ground to hope that God will preserve us and our Society, by keeping strictly to our duty, than by taking up unjustifiable methods of our own. A Kingdom can hardly be supposed to be in greater streights in this matter, then the Kingdom of *Judah* was all those six Years of *Athaliah*'s Usurpation, but for all that, these formidable businesses of *disbanding Societies, of ruining a Nati-*

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on, was no reaſon at all for their ſwearing to her; but they truſted Gods Providence, and ſo muſt we; which (as the Dr. can tell us when it ſerves his turn) *takes care of all extraordinary Caſes, and there we muſt leave them.*

What follows in the Dr. is mighty fine: *He does not think that Protection and Allegiance*, *but he thinks Government and Allegiance are ſuch relatives, as the one cannot ſubſiſt without the other, if the Prince cannot Govern, the People cannot Obey*; and therefore forſooth, becauſe they cannot obey him, they muſt fight againſt him and kill him, and do their utmoſt to ruine him: for ſaith he, *As far as he quits his Government he quits their* (his Subjects) *Allegiance, and leaves his Subjects as he does his Crown, to be poſſeſſed by another*; that is, ſo ſoon as *Joaſh* was taken away and hid, the Subjects were forthwith diſcharged of their Allegiance to him, and they as well as his Crown, were to be poſſeſſed by *Athaliah*; for as the Dr. ſays, *He may have a Legal Right to both, but he cannot actually have the Subjects Allegiance without the Crown*; *nor can Subjects pay him their Allegiance without his being reſtored to the Poſſeſſion of his Throne, no more than they can obey, when he cannot command.* Now the Dr. tells us, *This is as certain as any Propoſition in Logic*: And for all that, it is as plain a fallacy as ever I met with, and the inſtance before us lays it open, and I ask the Dr. Was the Reſtoring *Joaſh* to the Throne an Act of their Allegiance or no? If not, What Duty was it? But if it was, then Allegiance follows the Perſon of the King, tho he be out of the Poſſeſſion of the Throne. I know the Dr. tells us, *That JOASH was firſt Anointed, and Proclaim'd before any one ſtirred a finger againſt ATHALIAH*; But if that made any alteration in the matter, had *Athaliah* come but an hour ſooner, the Subjects muſt have been all her own, (for ſhe was in Poſſeſſion of the Throne) and were bound in Conſcience to ſtand by her, and if ſhe required it to have knocked *Joaſh* on the head, as a Capital Enemy to her Government. But the Dr. knows well enough, that his Anointing and Proclaiming did not make him King, but that (according to the Rules of Succeſſion in that and other Kingdoms) he was King all the time of *Athaliah*'s Uſurpation, and Allegiance was due to him, and upon the account of that they reſtored him. And then it follows, that Allegiance is due to a Prince, tho his Throne be poſſeſſed by an Uſurper. The Foundation the Dr. builds all this upon is a miſtake, *And that is, That Government and Allegiance are ſuch Relatives as do MUTUO SE PONERE ET TOLLERE.* Now by Government the Dr. means the actual Adminiſtration of it. And then Government and Allegiance are ſo far from being ſuch Relatives, that they are no Relatives at all, they are only the Acts of Relatives, and to ſay the Acts of Relatives are Relatives, is ſo far from *being as certain, as any Propoſition in Logic*, that it is Logical Non-ſence; it is to ſay that the Actual Government of a Maſter, and the Obedience of Servants are Relatives; ſo that, if a Maſter be ſpirited away, or taken Captive, ſo as he can give no Directions in his Family, nor actually govern it, his Servants immediately ceaſe to be his Servants, and the Relation is extinct, and when in ſome time after he recovers his Liberty and returns to his Family, he finds his Houſe thrown out at windows, or his Servants flown, or his Family beſtowed upon another Maſter that will govern it, for they have nothing to do with him; the Relation was only between his actual Government and their Obedience: And ſaith the Dr. *When one of the Relatives is loſt, the Relation is deſtroy'd,*

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and nothing but the Memory of it left. The Relation is only between King and Subject, and the Actual Administration of Government of the one hand and paying Allegiance on the other, are but the Acts of that Relation, and Consequential to it, but are not Relatives themselves; nor do they, *mutuo se ponere & tollere*; if a Subject is taken Captive, or otherwise hinder'd from paying Actual Allegiance, is the Relation lost, and does he therefore immediately Cease to be a Subject? And therefore neither doth a King; if he be hinder'd from the Actual Administration of Government, cease to be a King; but hath the same Right to our Allegiance, in and out of Possession: Allegiance was due to *Joash*, before he Actually administred the Government; Nay, when an Usurper Actually administred it, and so it was to *David*, tho he fled out of the Countrey. Before I have done with this instance, there is another thing to be remark'd from it; the Dr. in his Preface tells us concerning Schism, that the Principles, a Pamphlet proceeds upon, are such as would have made all the *Jews* Schismaticks, when the High Priest became Annual, and makes the *Greek* Church Schismaticks, as often as the Grand Seignior changes their Patriarch. Now I have but one question to ask him, and it is in the instance before us, suppose *Athaliah* should have depos'd *Jehoiada*, and put another High Priest in his place, who were the *Jews* bound in Conscience to Communicate with! Or does he believe they would have deserted *Jehoiada*, and have joyn'd themselves any more to *Athaliah*'s High Priest, than they did to *Athaliah* her self: when the Dr. gives me a clear answer to this, he shall hear more of my mind.

3. The Dr's Distinction is against him. 'Tis true, God did entayle the Kingdom of *Judah* on the family of *David*, and for that Reason they ought not to Submit to an Usurper, but this is so far from being a Reason, why they may Submit to one in other Kingdoms, where entayles are made by Laws, that it is a Reason, and a very good one, why they ought not: For Gods entayling the Crown of *Judah*, was the Law of that Kingdom in that respect, and the people of other Kingdoms are as much bound to observe their own Laws, as the people of *Judah* were theirs. All Humane Laws that are just, bind in conscience, and (according to the Dr's own Principles) These Laws were made by God's Authority. So that the Dr. mistakes the Question; we do not oppose Humane Laws to Gods Authority, but we oppose Laws, that are made by God's Authority, and which are a Rule to us, to Providence which is no Rule. When God entayl'd the Crown upon *Davids* Posterity, they had then a Legal Right to it, and so hath every Family in other Kingdomes upon which an entayl is made by the Respective Laws of the Countrey. King *Charles* the Second had as good a Right to the Crown of *England*, as *Joash* had to that of *Judah*, and *Cromwells* Usurpation was no more a bar to him, nor gave *Cromwell* by his Possession of the Throne, any more Right to our Allegiance, than *Athaliahs* was against *Joash*; or then her Possession gave her a Right to the Allegiance of the people of *Judah*: God gave other Political Laws to his people, as well as this of Succession, but will any man say therefore, that the Municipal Laws in other Countreys were not in all Respects as binding, to the Respective people. But to come nearer to our purpose: The Division of the Land of *Canaan* to the Twelve Tribes, was Expresly Commanded by GOD himself; and here we may try the full strength of the Dr's Argument. The Possession

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of the Land of *Canaan*, to each Tribe and family was allotted, and appointed by Gods Expreſs Command, but the Poſſeſſions in all other Countries, are only by his Providence. And therefore (according to the Dr's way of Reaſoning) every man that wrongfully poſſeſs'd himſelf of another Mans Eſtate in that Land, muſt be made to reſtore it; for God had Expreſly given it to the other, and to his Family. But in all other Countries, if a Man by Providence, get his Neighbours Eſtate, he muſt have it; for the event is Gods act, and 'tis his Evident Decree, and Council, that he ſhould have it, and
Pag. 25. to deny it, *is to ſay that God as well as men, is confin'd to Humane Laws* in diſpoſing of Eſtates. But now if this be falſe Reaſoning, and ſuch acts of providence are no ſign that it is Gods will he ſhould have the eſtate, but the Laws of the Land muſt take place notwithſtanding; Then it is plain the Dr's Diſtinction is vain, and there is not that difference in this Reſpect, between the Laws that God himſelf makes, and thoſe that are made by his Authority; for God gave the eſtates of private men to them and their heirs, as expreſly as he did entayl the Crown upon *Davids* family.

There is one thing the Dr. aſſerts, which (if it were true) would overthrow all that is ſaid, and therefore deſerves to be conſidered; and that is, that *the Laws of the Land are the Rule of Conſcience, when they do not contradict*
Pag. 52. *the Laws of God; but when they do, they are no Rules to us, but their Obligation muſt give place to a Divine Authority.* Now if (in the preſent caſe) the Dr. could prove this as ſtrongly, as he affirms it, he hath gained the cauſe; for there is no diſpute, but we muſt Obey the Laws of God, before thoſe of men! But where is this Law of God that commands us to Obey Uſurpers? Where is it ever affirm'd in Scripture in Expreſs Terms, or Deduced from thence by evident Conſequence? This Law had need be very clear and evident, and the Dr. had need be very ſure of it, when he builds not only his book, but his Practiſe upon it, in plain Contradiction (by his own Confeſſion) to the Laws of the Land. He owns the Laws of the Land are the Rule of Conſcience, and if thoſe be clear and certain, and it be doubtful, and uncertain, whether the other be the Law of God or no, Unbyaſs'd Conſcience would ſoon Determine the Caſe, that we are bound to follow that which is certain and plain, rather than that which is doubtful and obſcure: Now that it is not clear, that there is ſuch a Law of God, is evident not only from the Controverſies about it in the late diſmal times of Uſurpation, but that no learned men could ever eſpy this Law, before the times of *John Goodwyn*, and the Dr. muſt have a great Opinion of his own judgment, if he think that himſelf, *John Goodwyn*, and Mr. *Eaton*, can bear up the Authority of this interpretation againſt all the world. The Dr. himſelf tells us with Reſpect to the Titles of Princes, That *theſe are great diſputes among Learned Men*; *and how then ſhould Unlearned Men underſtand them? And I cannot think* (ſaith he) *that the Reſolution of Conſcience in ſuch matters as all mankind are concern'd in, ſhould depend upon ſuch Niceties as Learned Men themſelves cannot agree in.* And is not this the Caſe of the Main Principle, and indeed the only material Argument in his whole Book? And it concludes more ſtrongly againſt him, for the Current Judgment of Learned Men is on the other ſide, and not many, if any Learned Man beſides himſelf, ever held there was ſuch a Law, or Concurred with him in his interpretation of Scripture; ſo that, if he could give a plauſible account of his own interpretation, it
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would

would hardly be ſufficient to warrant ſuch a Book, or ſuch a Practice, contrary to a plain and known Rule, and about which there is otherwiſe no Controverſie. And this I take to be a ſufficient Anſwer; however, I ſhall briefly Conſider what he urges from Scripture.

Thoſe Teſtimonies he Cites from the Old Teſtament, *That God giveth Kingdoms to whomſoever he will, that he removes Kings, and ſetteth up Kings*, *Dan.* 4. 17. & 2. 21. 37. Theſe are certainly True, but nothing to his Purpoſe; for God did always ſet up, and remove Kings; but this was no Evidence that God would have Uſurpers obey'd as Kings, as is evident in the Caſe of *Athaliah*. And God did as much remove Kings, and ſet up Kings in the Kingdom of *Judah*, as in any other Kingdom. And therefore it cannot from theſe Expreſſions be neceſſarily concluded, That every Perſon that gets Poſſeſſion of the Throne, is a King, and ought to have the Duties belonging to a King, payd to him. But the Truth is, the Doctor throughout his Book, begs the Queſtion: He takes it for granted, That every Uſurper is a King, when that is the Thing to be proved; and he knows all Learned Men deny that an Uſurper is a King, as *Athaliah* was no Queen, though ſhe had got the Poſſeſſion of the Throne; And what is ſetting up Kings to an Uſurper, who is no King. However, when Perſons have Poſſeſſion of the Throne who have a Legal Title, either by Deſcent, or other Acquiſition, and who are Kings by the Conſent of all Mankind, it is plain, that God ſets them up. And it cannot neceſſarily be concluded, that any more is meant by God's ſetting up Kings. And if it cannot be neceſſarily concluded, then here is not from thence any ſufficient Warrant, to call every Uſurper God's King, and to pay Duties to them accordingly; as *Athaliah* was not God's Queen, though ſhe had Poſſeſſion of the Throne, and though God remov'd, and ſet up Kings then, as well as in any other Age.

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His Teſtimony from the New Teſtament is, *Rom.* 13. 1, 2, *Let every Soul be Subject to the Higher Powers, for all Power is of God*, &c. Now by *Powers* (contrary to the current of all good interpreters) the Dr. underſtands Uſurped as well as Lawful Powers; And his Reaſon is becauſe the *Scripture makes no diſtinction between Kings, and Uſurpers*. Now I had thought the Caſe of *Athaliah* had been a diſtinction, and had this Precept been given in thoſe days, I wonder whether any body would have doubted of whom it ought to be underſtood, whether of *Athaliah*, or *Joaſh*. But (ſaith the Dr.) *If the Apoſtle had intended ſuch a diſtinction, he ought to have ſaid it in expreſs words*. And why ſo I pray? Do's not the nature of the thing ſufficiently diſtinguiſh it? And are there not general Rules about Right and Wrong, which extend to all Perſons and Caſes? Does not the Doctor himſelf tell us, that St. *Peter* explaines St. *Paul*, *Submit your ſelves to the King* (i. e.) ſaith the Dr. in St. *Paul*'s Phraſe to the *Higher Powers*; and is there any need in ſuch injunctions to diſtinguiſh between a King and no King? The *Apoſtle* Exhorts *to Obey them that have Rule over you*, meaning the Miniſter of the Goſpel; now the *Apoſtle* makes no diſtinction between Lawful Miniſters, and intruders; and therefore if any Man can but get a Congregation, he muſt be the perſon underſtood in this Precept, and the Dr. knows there has been as much Uſurpation of the Miniſtry as ever was of Civil Government. In ſhort, the Dr's Reaſon, for his interpretation is againſt him, There has ever been a Diſtinction in the World between Legal and ſurped Powers, and 'tis probable enough that St. *Paul* (who

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Caſe of Reſiſt. P. 142.

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(who was ſo Learned a Man) knew it; and if he had intended to enjoyn Obedience to Uſurped Powers, 'tis probable he would have ſaid ſo in expreſs Terms; but ſince he never ſaid ſo, we have Reaſon to conclude he never intended it.

4. In Anſwer to the Author, it is aſſerted above: That his Interpretation (and the ſame may be ſaid of the Dr's.) juſtifies an unreaſonable and impious Doctrine, by making the Acts or Permiſſions of Providence, a Rule for Practiſe, againſt Right and Juſtice. Something of this the Dr. takes Notice of, and puts it into an Objection.

Pag. 34. *Have not Pyrates and Robbers as good a Title to my Purſe, as an Uſurper has to the Crown? Does not the Providence of God order and diſpoſe all theſe events?* To which the Dr. thus Anſwers; *The Diſpute is not about Humane and Legal Right in either Caſe, but about Authority; now no Man pretends that Thieves and Pyrates have God's Authority.* I Anſwer; What is this to the Purpoſe? I know Thieves and Robberts have not God's Authority, neither hath an Uſurper; but have they not God's Providence as well as an Uſurper? And if Poſſeſſion of *Authority* by Providenne, gives a Right to it, Why does not the Poſſeſſion of *my Purſe*, by the ſame Providence, give a Right to it? The Dr. puts it into the Objection, *Have not* Robbers as *good a Title* to my Purſe, as an Uſurper to the Crown? And it is certain they *have* as *good a Title*, for they have the very ſame. I grant, That taking a Purſe, and taking Authority, are Two Things, and ſo are alſo Uſurpation and Right. But the Queſtion is about Providence, and that is the ſame; he that takes a Purſe, takes it by Providence, as well as he that takes a Throne; and if Providence gives a Right, the one hath it as well as the other. But, *The Scripture* (ſaith the Dr.) *expreſly tells us, that Kingdoms are diſpos'd of God, that all Power is of God*; and does not the ſame Scripture tell us, that the Earth is the Lord's, and the Fulneſs thereof, that he diſpoſeth of it as he pleaſes, that when *Job* was rob'd, he ſaid, *The Lord hath taken away*: But if the Scripture had not ſaid ſo, the Dr. ſays it; for he tells us all Events are Gods Act and Deed. And then it muſt follow, that the Poſſeſſion of my Purſe by a Thief, is as much God's Decree and Council, as the Poſſeſſion of the Throne. The Dr. founds all this in God's Creation; *God* (ſaith he) *is the Natural Lord of the World, becauſe he made it, and no Creature has any Right to Govern the World, or any Part of it, but as he receives any Authority from God.* Pag. 15. And is not this the ſame in all other Reſpects? Are not all Mens Eſtates God's as well as Authority? And has any Man a Right to his Eſtate, but what God gives him? And does it thence follow, that ever any Man can get by Providence, though it be never ſo much againſt the Laws and common Right, it is his own, becauſe God is not ty'd to Human Laws, and hath a Right to the World by Creation, and may give it to whom he pleaſe. And I wonder what Reaſon there is, That 'tis a more certain Sign to us, that the Poſſeſſion of Power by Providence, gives any more Right to it, than the Poſſeſſion of Goods, or an Eſtate gives a Right to them.

5. It is before aſſerted, That the Authors Interpretation reproaches the Vertue and Loyalty of theſe admirable Men that ſuffer'd between the Years 42 and 60. And the very ſame does the Dr's Interpretation, and all his Arguments: Now this the Dr. takes Notice of, but ſays it is *only a Prejudice, but no Argument, nor can be form'd into an Argument.* Pag. 45. And why not I pray? I had thought an Argument from Example had been an Ar-

gument, though not always a very good one. And yet (when it ſerves his Purpoſe) he can make uſe of a ſingle Example, and that alſo very doubtful, as the Caſe of *Faddus*. But the Example of ſo many Excellent Men, at once, and freſh in our Memories, and whoſe very Examples ſupported the Honour and Reputation of the Proteſtant Religion, when the Dr's Arguments, and the Practiſes conſequent upon them, made it ſtink in the Noſtrils of the World. And certainly ſuch Examples as theſe, have their Weight, and deſerve from us, and all Proteſtants in the World, high Veneration. And it may juſtly move any Mans Indignation, to ſee the Worthys of the World, and of our Church, mock'd and diminiſh'd, and repreſented as Knaves or Fools, and all to ſupport a mean and pitiful Argument, that has nothing in it. However, the Dr. owns, that this is a Prejudice, and ſo it is, and a very conſiderable one: And I wonder what he hath ſaid to remove it; not one Word to the Purpoſe. He tells indeed of ſome Differences, but not one that is any Difference as to the Matter before us, of Submiſſion to Uſurped Powers: I ſhall put them all together, becauſe the Dr. ſays, *All together they will be more than Anſwer enough*; and yet I think all together, and as much more, will not make half an Anſwer. They are theſe. *The great Villanies of thoſe Days, bare-fac'd Rebellion, the Murder of one of the Beſt of Princes, the Barbarous Uſage of the King's Friends, by Sequeſtration, Plunders, Impriſonments; Biſhops, &c. turn'd out, the Loyal Clergy could not keep their Livings without Renouncing the* Church *of* England: *The whole Government, and the Fundamental Conſtitution of the Nation was over-turn'd; And moreover, their Government was never ſettled, but frequently chang'd and model'd; and they had not a National Conſent and Submiſſion; for the* Rump *was not a Parliament, nor the Repreſentatives of the Nation.* Now the Dr. maintains, That Submiſſion is due to Uſurped Powers, by what ill Means ſoever they attain it: And that I think is Anſwer enough, That the *Villanies* he mentions, makes no Difference in his Argument: The barbarous Uſage indeed, made ſome Difference in point of Intereſt, but none in point of Conſcience; for if they were bound in Conſcience to ſubmit, they were ſo, notwithſtanding ſuch Uſage (*Vid. Dr.* Sherlock's *Caſe of Reſiſtance*): But the Truth is, They met with ſuch Uſage, becauſe they did not ſubmit; if they would have ſubmitted, and turn. and become Parties to the Government, they would have uſed them very kindly; and it may be, have reſtor'd their Eſtates, and *Livings*. As to the *Biſhops*, *Deans*, and *Clergy*, the Caſe is concerning Civil Government, not Eccleſiaſtical; and I do not find they were bound to Abjure *Epiſcopacy*; and I hope they being diſabled to keep a Living, eſpecially if it be a good one, is not, a ſufficient Reaſon to Rebel. If that be the Caſe, King *William* had beſt take care to keep up the Rights of the Church, or elſe the Dr's Oath, and thoſe of his Brethren, do not bind them. As to the overturning the Conſtitution, that is but changing the Form of Government, as the Doctor knows the Convocation ſays, *When ſuch Degenerate Forms of Government* are throughly ſettled; and when the Dr. ſpeaks of Uſurped Powers in general, I ſuppoſe he does not mean it only of a King, but of a Government. Theſe Uſurpers had uſurped the Power of the Lords and Commons, as well as of the King, but they were Uſurpers ſtill, and no more Uſurpers in that than in the other, except the Dr. thinks, that they that Uſurp upon the King, muſt be obey'd; but they that

Pag. 8.

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that uſurp upon the Parliament, muſt not. But (ſaith the Dr.) the Government was not ſettled; if he could prove this, he might let all the reſt alone; but why was it not ſettled? *Becauſe it was frequently chang'd*: but every one of theſe Changes was a *Settlement*, if the Dr's Notion of a Settlement be right, and *Cromwel* was fully poſſeſs'd of the Throne for Five Years, and more fully and quietly than the Preſent Government, all *Scotland* and *Ireland*, as well as *England*, was in his Hands But as the National Conſent in Parliament, that is indeed part of our Conſtitution, but what is that to Uſurpation, which may uſurp as well upon all Branches of the Conſtitution, as upon one. The Dr. tells us, that Legal Rights is not in the Queſtion, God is above Law, and to whom he gives Authority, muſt be obey'd, and the Poſſeſſion of it is an Evidence that he gives it. And if *Cromwel* poſſeſs'd the Authority of *Kings*, *Lords* and *Commons*, why then he had God's Authority in all theſe Reſpects, and ought to have been obey'd. And let any Man read the Dr's Notion of a Settlement, (and he tells us, he deſpairs of ever ſeeing another) and try if it will not fit *Cromwel* in all Reſpects, juſt as if it had been made for him.

Pag. 48. But there is one thing more yet behind, and that is an Argument from Intereſt; and that I ſuppoſe is not much better than an Argument from Example: *In the Late Times* (ſaith he) *of Rebellion, all the Friends of Monarchy, &c. were bound in Intereſt to take all Opportunities to reſtore the King*; but were they not bound in *Conſcience* to the contrary? If they were not, all the Dr's Arguments were nothing; if they were, then he has given a very Honourable Character of theſe excellent Men, that they preferr'd their Intereſt to their Conſciences, which if any man can believe, then I will engage to believe all the Arguments in the Doctor's Book.

Before I end this, I ſhall offer the Dr. one Argument, and it is this: If Poſſeſſion of Soveraign Power, contrary to Law, be God's Authority, and ought to be obey'd, then whatever Soveraign Power a Prince poſſeſſes himſelf of, is likewiſe God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed: For, the formal Reaſon of Obedience to ſuch a Prince is, becauſe he hath God's Authority; and the Evidence that he hath that Authority, is, becauſe he is poſſeſs'd of Soveraign Power. And therefore, ſo far as a Prince can poſſeſs himſelf of Soveraign Power, ſo far he hath God's Authority, and ought to be obeyed. Now I take it for granted, and the Dr. will not deny it, That to be Abſolute and Arbitrary is not inconſiſtent with the notion of Soveraign Power: If therefore a Prince in a limitted Monarchy, reſolves to be arbitrary, (which the Dr. grants may very eaſily be, when he has all the Power of the Kingdom in his hands, and muſt not be reſiſted) to make his Will the Law, and to exerciſe an illegal Power, he muſt be obeyed, as God's Authority, whatſoever the Laws of the Land ſay to the contrary. For, the Dr. tells us, *That when the Laws of the Land contradict the Laws of God, they are no Rule to us, but their Obligation muſt give place to Divine Authority: i. e.* When God gives a Man Authority; and that is (according to him) when he is by Providence poſſeſſed of it, he muſt be obeyed, notwithſtanding any Injunction of Human Laws. So that if a Judge were to adminiſter Juſtice according to the Laws, or, if he does not ſwear, he is obliged to it; yet if the King command him to give Sentence without Tryal, or forms of Law, he

Caſe of Reſiſt. *P.* 134.

P. 52.

he is bound to do it, for the obligation he has to the Laws muſt give place to the Authority of God, which the King is poſſeſſed of. And then, alas! what will become of us, who refus'd to read the *Declaration*, and the Gentlemen of *Magdalen College*? we thought the Laws were our Rule, and they their Statutes, and ſo it ſeems they were; but if they contradicted the Authority of God as they did, if they contradicted the Power the King was poſſeſſed of, their Obligation ceas'd. Now, I ſuppoſe, no body at that time diſputed K. J's Power, if he had only commanded them to chuſe another Preſident contrary to their Statutes and their Oaths, and had not been able to *Cruſh them*, if they refuſed, (the Dr's Characteriſtick of a Settlement in the Poſſeſſion of Power) then the Statutes were their Rule, and they were bound in Conſcience to obſerve them; but if he were able to *Cruſh* them, (as what he actually did he was certainly able to do) then their Obligation was to give place to the Authority of God, manifeſted by Poſſeſſion of Power, and they were bound in Conſcience to obſerve his Command, contrary to their Statutes and Oaths, in obedience to God's Authority, which is ſuperiour to them.

P. 9.

Now, this is a pretty plain Caſe; and if the Dr's Arguments be good, then we our ſelves, and the Fellows of *Magdalen College*, upon pretence of obeying the Laws, have only been diſobeying God's Authority; for the aſſuming an *Illegal Power* is no more againſt the Laws, than *Illegal* and *Uſurped Powers*; and God, when he gives Authority, is confin'd to our Laws and Conſtitution no more, in the extent of Power, than in the Perſon; and the only Evidence that we have, that God gives it, is Poſſeſſion of it by Providence; and whatſoever Power a Prince is poſſeſſed of, hath the ſame Evidence, and conſequently is a Branch of the ſame Authority. And *Arbitrary Power* is not inconſiſtent with the notion of *Soveraign Power*, and whatever Limitations of *Government* there are now in the World, they are only Limitations made by Human Laws, and of no force againſt God's Authority: That is, in ſhort, there can be nothing ſaid to juſtifie Obedience to a Poſſeſſor of the Throne contrary to Law, but what is of equal force to juſtifie Obedience to the exerciſe of acts of *Illegal Power*, contrary to Law; and the Conſcience is as much obliged to one as to the other; and that is, That it is not the Laws of the Land, but the Power of the Prince, which is the Rule of Conſcience. And here is the plain Queſtion; Had the Gentlemen of *Magdalen College* comply'd with the Will and Power of the King, contrary to their Statutes and their Oaths, had they in ſo doing been perjur'd? if they had, then the Laws are to be a Rule, contrary to the Poſſeſſion of Power, let that Poſſeſſion have never ſo much Providential Evidence of God's Authority, and let the Perſon ſo poſſeſſed be never ſo able to *Cruſh* them for Refuſal. But then it will follow, that all the Dr's Arguments of Poſſeſſion by Providence, contrary to Laws, will really ſignifie very little: for, How comes an Oath to Local Statutes to be of more force than an Oath of Allegiance? and, I would fain ſee a Reaſon, why the Laws of a private College ſhould oblige the Members of that Society, more than the Laws of a Kingdom ſhould oblige the Subjects of that Kingdom. If it be ſaid, That though the King exerciſed an Illegal Power, yet he was not throughly ſettled in the poſſeſſion of it, becauſe he had not a National Conſent to it: I ſay ſo too, but then I ſay likewiſe,

that an illegal Power is not throughly ſettled, nor does bind the Subject to Obedience, 'till it becomes Legal, for a National Conſent, may part with the Rights of a Nation, as well as the Conſent of a Prince may part with his own Rights. And then it follows, that Poſſeſſion of Power, though there be Providence, and an Army in the caſe, is not a Rule for Obedience to it, as to the Authority of God, but only the Legality of Power.

And thus I have Examin'd all that the Dr. offers from the Convocation Book, and incidentally the main Principles and Arguments of his Book: And if what I have ſaid, be True, with Reſpect to the Convocation, then I have Anſwer'd his whole Book, by his own Confeſſion: For he tells us, Pag. *That I may not appear to be ſingular, and to advance Paradoxes, I ſhall prove it from the Doctrines and Principles of the* Church *of* England. But then, if he hath not prov'd it from the Doctrines of the *Church of England*, as he hath not, if he hath not prov'd it from the Convocation, then by his own Confeſſion he is ſingular, and advances Paradoxes; and I hope Paradoxes do not need to be anſwer'd, let People that write them, challenge as much as they pleaſe: And as for Singularity, I confeſs he has ſome Company, but ſuch, as he hath no great need to be proud of; *John Goodwyn*, and *Eaton*, and Three or Four more ſuch as They, have maintain'd the very ſame; and he might as well have challeng'd us to Anſwer them, and it had been to as much Purpoſe; for they have the very ſame Arguments. But one would have thought amongſt Men of the *Church* of *England*, the very Naming them, would have been Anſwering them. But for any other in any Age, I believe it would be hard to find any ſingle judicious Man, who has ever own'd His principles, or Sence of Scripture, and any man that hath ever heard of this Diſtinction, *Tyrannus ſine Titulo*, & *Tyrannus exercitio*, is able to diſcover the Novelty of the Dr's Principles; and that he does nothing but maintain Paradoxes, if to maintain Opinions contrary to the general Sence of Mankind, be to maintain Paradoxes.

I ſhall Conclude with the Dr. as I did with the Author, with a Quotation to Confirm what I have ſaid, and with a Requeſt to him;

Firſt, My Quotation ſhall be out of Dr. *Sherlock*'s *Caſe of Reſiſtance*, *Pag.* 127, & *Seq.*

Is the Power of Victorious Rebels and Uſurpers from God? Did OLIVER CROMWEL *receive his Power from God, then it ſeems it was unlawful to Reſiſt him too, or to Conſpire againſt him: Then all thoſe Loyal Subjects, who refuſed to ſubmit to him, when he had got the* POWER *into his Hands, were Rebels and Traytors?*

To this I Anſwer.

That the moſt proſperous Rebel is not the Higher Powers, while the NATURAL PRINCE, *to whom we owe Obedience and Subjection is in being: And therefore, though ſuch Men may*

get the Power into their hands by God's Permiſſion, yet not by God's Ordinance; and he who Reſiſts them, does not Reſiſt the Ordinance of God, but the Uſurpations of Men. In Hereditary Kingdoms, the King never dies, but the ſame Minute that the Natural Perſon of one King dies, the Crown deſcends upon the next of Blood, and therefore, he who Rebelleth againſt the Father, and Murders him, continues a Rebel in the Reign of the Son, which Commences with his Fathers Death.

Now the Dr. may ſay perhaps, that he has renounced this: But it may be true enough, for all that, and ſo it is for any thing he hath ſaid, to the contrary in his New Book; But to ſatisfie him, I do not quote it for his Authority; for whatever his honeſty is, his Authority is not ſo much, and I ſuppoſe he does not expect it: But I cite it, becauſe it is true, and is a plain declaration of the ſence of the Church of *England*, at that time; for this paſſage was never yet queſtion'd, 'till he hath now done it himſelf. And I believe, ſhould any man at that time, have but ask'd him the Queſtion, concerning his Preſent Opinions and Practices, he would have return'd ſuch an anſwer, as *Hazael* gave to *Eliſha*, when he Prophetically told him of thoſe things, which he afterwards Actually did, *Is thy ſervant a Dog, that he ſhould do this great thing!* But *Hazael* afterwards chang'd his mind, and ſo has the Dr. 2 Kings 8. 13

2. My Requeſt to him is, that, when he next publiſhes a Book, he will not put ſuch an Aſſertion in the Preface; *Though I refus'd the Oaths, I never engaged in any Faction againſt it: I never made it my buſineſs to diſwade men from it*, &c. For *Never* is a very long time, and ſome body, or other, may chance to remember, and take notice of it; and when they ſee ſuch a bold Aſſertion in the Preface, they may be apt to Suſpect, that all the Book is the ſame piece.

FINIS.

LONDON,
Printed in the Year,
1690.